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GO WORLD

SUMMER 1985 NO.40



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
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The cover: A rare example of a votive painting on wood featuring a go subject. Such wooden tablets are given as offerings to a Shinto deity at a shrine after one's prayers have been answered. *From the collection of Lou Cohen.*

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GO WORLD NEWS

Otake Defends Gosei Title

Otake Hideo has extended his remarkable record in the Gosei title and has now held it for six years in a row. In the best-of-five match for the 10th Gosei, the challenger, Kudo Norio 9-dan, was unable to break Otake's monopoly. Kudo has always done very badly against Otake and after dropping the first two games had lost fourteen in a row to him. It must have been a great relief to him when he finally picked up a win in the third game, but that was the limit of his resistance.

The results:

Game 1 (4 July). Otake (W) won by resignation.
Game 2 (17 July). Otake (B) won by 6½ points.
Game 3 (31 July). Kudo (B) won by resignation.
Game 4 (7 August). Otake (B) won by 3½ points.

Kobayashi Starts Well in Meijin Title.

The long-awaited return match between Kobayashi Koichi and Cho Chikun has finally materialized. Kobayashi lost the 37th Honinbo title match 2-4 to Cho in 1982, but he is regarded as one of Cho's most dangerous rivals. He is one of the few players with a plus record (18-16) against Cho and, although he, along with everyone else, has been eclipsed by Cho in the 1980's, he had a superior record to him in the 1970's. Although they are fellow Kitani disciples, they are said to feel a very keen rivalry that should make the Meijin clash an exciting one. Kobayashi had made a good start to the title match, beating Cho Chikun at his own brand of territorial go and winning by

5½ points in the first game.

Late news. The second game, played on 25, 26 September, was won by Cho.

Kobayashi had a close call in the Meijin league when he won his final game, against Yoda, by a bare half point. He thereby managed to avoid a playoff against Otake, who beat him in the Meijin league playoff last year. Only the top two ranked players in a tie qualify for a playoff, so Kato would not have been eligible. This rule also applies to deciding who stays in the league, so it favours the status quo. The same six players who remained from the 9th league keep their places in the 11th league. Takagi, on the same two points, prevails over Ohira and Yamashiro. Yoda, in his league debut, was only able to pick up one win.

Kobayashi Koichi to Challenge Kato Oza

This is going to be a busy autumn for Kobayashi Koichi, for he will also be challenging Kato for the Oza title, which became a best-of-five match last year. In the playoff, held on 5 September, he defeated O Rissei 7-dan by 5½ points. This was O's second loss in an Oza playoff (the first was to Kato in 1982). The first game, played on 19 September, was won by Kato.

NEC Japan-China Super Go: The Final Showdown

Twice it appeared that this series was going to end in an anticlimax, with one player disposing of most of the other team, but finally it has come down to a showdown between the two captains:

10th Meijin League

Rank	Name	O	K.K.	I	T	R	K.M.	O	Ya	Yo	Score	Place
1	Otake	—	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	6 - 2	2
2	Kobayashi K.	1	—	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	7 - 1	1
3	Ishida A.	0	0	—	1	1	0	1	1	1	5 - 3	4
4	Takagi	0	0	0	—	0	0	1	0	1	2 - 6	6
5	Rin Kaiho	1	0	0	1	—	0	1	1	1	5 - 3	5
6	Kato	0	1	1	1	1	—	0	1	1	6 - 2	3
7	Ohira	0	0	0	0	0	1	—	0	1	2 - 6	—
7	Yamashiro	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	—	0	2 - 6	—
7	Yoda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	—	1 - 7	—

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.



Kobayashi Koichi wins the first game of the 1985 Meijin title.

Nie Weiping of China and Fujisawa Shuko of Japan. After Japan's bad start, Kobayashi Koichi turned the tables by defeating six Chinese players in a row, but then he was upset by Nie, who went on to defeat Kato as well. Final victory will be decided in the clash between Nie and Shuko, which will take place in November.

1985 International Paris Go Tournament

A new European record was set when 282 players met in the Japy Gymnasium to take part in the 6th International Paris Go Tournament (held on 6–8 April). The top section of the six-round tournament was won (on SOS) by Lee Choon Suh 6-dan of Korea with 5 wins. Also finishing on 5 points were Yoo Jong Su 6-dan (Korea) and Andre Moussa 5-dan of France.

In the section for 2-kyu to 2-dan players, those finishing with 5 wins were Groot 2-dan, van der Steen 2-dan, Luyten 1-kyu, Zwiers 1-kyu, Polak 1-kyu (the above all of Holland), and Haglund 2-kyu of France.

Worthy of note in the section for 3-kyu and

under were the performances of three French players, Polle, Prat, and Mackowiak, who all scored six wins.

The lightning tournament was won by yet another Dutchman, Robert Rehm. The winner of the random draw for a ticket to Korea among players 2-kyu and up with 5 wins was Edwin Luyten.

Schlemper Wins 1985 European Championship

Ronald Schlemper 7-dan of Holland showed his class by triumphing over a mammoth field of 283 competitors in the IBM European Go Championship 1985, held from 20 July to 3 August on the island of Terschelling in the north of Holland. Schlemper scored a perfect nine wins to lead the field by two points. His closest game was against former European champion Matthew Macfadyen 6-dan of Great Britain, whom he beat by 5½ points. Macfadyen finished in a tie for second place with Pierre Colmez 4-dan of France (both on 7 points), but Macfadyen won the playoff. Following them were:

4th: Andre Moussa 5-dan (France): 6 points

5th: Rene Aaij 4-dan (Holland): 6 points
6th: Jean Michel 4-dan (France): 6 points
7th: Robert Rehm 5-dan (Holland): 6 points
8th: Cas Muller 5-dan (Holland): 5 points
9th: Janusz Kraszek 5-dan (Poland): 5 points
10th: David Schoffel 4-dan (Ger.): 5 points

News in Brief

Tengen Semifinals

The following players will meet in the semifinals of the 11th Tengen tournament: Otake v. Cho, Rin v. Kobayashi Koichi.

Cho Back in Honinbo League

After one year in the wilderness, Cho Chikun has regained his place in the Honinbo league. Takemiya had better look to his laurels. Also regaining places in the league were Yamashiro and Sugiuchi, who were joined by O Meien 6-dan.

Miyazawa Wins Shinjin-O

Miyazawa Goro 7-dan has won his second Shinjin-O (king of the new stars) title, defeating the previous title-holder, Imamura Toshiya 6-dan of the Kansai Ki-in, 2-0 in the title match. Miyazawa also won this title in 1980.

THE FIRST US GO CONGRESS

by Roy Laird

The First US Go Congress was held from August 10-18, 1985 at Western Maryland College, a quiet dignified campus situated amidst the lush, rolling hills of western Maryland. Beautiful weather, the presence of several distinguished professional players and the exuberant camaraderie of a really fine group of folks combined to create an event that will be remembered for a long time to come.

Sixty-four players competed in the main tournament, played at one round per day and two hours per player by the Swiss system, and many people dropped by for the day or a brief stay, so that at any given time there were nearly 100 go players enjoying the activities and one another's company. As at the European Congress there were such events as lightning, team and 13x13 tournaments as well as an ongoing handicap tournament in which several players got in well over a dozen rounds.

On the final weekend the Eastern US Championship was held with a field of over 130 players (including two computers). Thomas Hsiang of Rochester, N.Y., who had already won the main tournament, fought his way to the top table in the final round, where he faced Ron Snyder of New York. When the smoke cleared, Ron had won both the right to compete for his second title as US Champion and for the right to rep-

resent the U.S. in the World Amateur Championship for the second time.

Four professional players attended the entire Congress, their generous availability further improving a superb teacher-student ratio. The Korean Go Association (Hanguk Kiwon) sent two professional 6-dans, Mr. Hong Jong Hyun and Mr. Chun Sam Jho. Mr. Hong is in charge of the training program for children in Korea. The Nihon Ki-in, with the support of the Japan Foundation and Japan Air Lines, also arranged for two Japanese professionals to attend. Miss Shinkai Hiroko 3-dan had prepared carefully for her first trip to America and referred often to a handwritten lexicon of go comments in English and Japanese to make sure she was expressing herself clearly. For Mr. Nakayama Noriyuki 5-dan this was a chance to renew old friendships, and to make many new ones with his exuberant manner and excellent English. Players who had met him on his previous trips to the U.S. and Europe were glad to see him again. He and Miss Shinkai also proved to be a respectable doubles team at ping-pong.

The high point of the Congress came on Saturday the 17th when Lin Hai-feng 9-dan arrived to begin his first visit to the U.S. Known since his emigration from Taiwan to Japan as Rin Kaiho, the quiet, amiable presence of this living legend made a deep impression on everyone attending the Congress. In addition, not everyone knew that the quiet young fellow who arrived with him was none other than O Rissei (Wang Li-ch'eng) 7-dan, a rising young star who is Rin's protege. Rin offered an analysis of a recent game of his own against Kato. Later, at an elegant reception accorded the Congress by the President of the College in his home, Rin relaxed over a casual game of shogi with Larry Kaufman, America's strongest shogi player and an organizer of the Congress. Some people were observed pinching themselves as they watched.

Generous support from many places helped to make the Congress such a wonderful success, including the Nihon Ki-in, the Hanguk Kiwon, the Japan Foundation and Japan Air Lines. Master Go Game and Sabaki Go Company each donated a fine full-size go board with legs, which were given away at a drawing at the awards ceremony. The Ing Chang-ki Wei-Chi Educational Foundation was especially generous, stunning the organizers with a gift of 100 boards and sets of stones, and four of Mr. Ing's beautiful 'tea-go tables'. In addition, they sponsored the trip by Rin and O Rissei in conjunction with the Ministry of Education in Taipei. And to top things off, they donated 100 electronic clocks of a new

special design by Mr. Ing, which can handle byo-yomi automatically. This was an immense relief to the organizers throughout the week. While there was some initial head-scratching as the operating procedure was explained, most people found the clocks fairly easy to operate and the byo-yomi feature worked perfectly. They were not ideally suited for lightning go, however, since they read out the player's remaining time in minutes only, except for the byo-yomi.

On Sunday, O Rissei gave a breathtaking exhibition of his strength in an exhibition match. Then Rin closed the Congress by playing a casual game with the new Eastern Champion while Nakayama and O commented, and we all went home with the feeling that the American go community is beginning to find itself. Organizers from all over the country traded notes, ideas and telephone numbers. People who had been playing alone or in small groups of beginners — what one wag called "kyu-ghettos" — found for the first time that they are part of a network of people all over the U.S. and around the world.

See you at next year's Congress in Seattle!

1985 WORLD YOUTH CHAMPIONSHIP

By Donald Potter

Taipei, August 8–15, this year, was again the scene of one of the go world's most inspired events, the World Youth Wei-ch'i Championship. Eighteen contestants representing Europe, North America, Australia and East Asia participated. Europe was well represented by three cerulean-eyed lads: Berna-Jan Buit and Raimond Zwiers of Holland, who placed 7th and 11th respectively, and Lauri Paatero of Finland, who placed 12th. It came as no surprise when Korea's 15-year-old Kong Byung-ju won the enormous first prize cup. Just before the tournament he easily outmaneuvered a local professional, taking only a two-stone handicap.

The occidental star of the competition was America's Janice Kim, who came second. Her countryman Tony Pa, a respectable 1-dan, came 13th. Australia was represented for the first time by Tasmanian Ralph Gaby, who won the prize for 'most spirited play' (ching shen chiang).

The most gentle team was without doubt from Japan: Nishizawa Yoshiyuki, Iro Rokuro and Iwata Rieko (the daughter of Iwata Hajime, pro. 6-dan), who placed 15th, 16th and 17th respectively. They are all about 2-dan — quite evenly matched with the occidentals. Although they are far from being the strongest amateurs of their age

in Japan, they were well selected and obviously enjoyed participating very much.

The question of the competitors' relative strength is one of the perennial problems of these international tournaments. Since their purpose is to encourage go, especially among occidentals, one wonders if it is a good idea to have a promising 2-kyu crushed five or six games in a row by powerful 6- and 7-dans. A possible solution would be to allow China, Japan and Korea to field their best players, either amateur or insei, and let them compete for an Asian cup and have a separate cup for occidentals.

An interesting innovation in this year's tournament was a competition among the chief delegates. Professor Kosaka of Kyoto University and towering John Givens (6'6") of Berkeley started out well, but both succumbed to Korea's delegate, Jang Kuk-won, who came first. The ever-resourceful former European champion Matthew Macfadyen placed second by upsetting one of Taiwan's top amateurs and chairman of the tournament, the redoubtable Dr. Shen.

This year's chief delegates had to compete for the privilege of representing their countries. It's a competition well worth winning. This tournament was not only well organized, but a very friendly atmosphere of goodwill and bonhomie everywhere prevailed. It is sponsored by a wealthy Taipei industrialist, Ing Chang-ki. Born in Ningpo in 1915, Mr. Ing began his career as a bank apprentice in Shanghai in 1931. In 1946 he became vice-president of the Bank of Taiwan. Later he branched out into chemicals, wool carbonizing, textiles and electronics. Mr. Ing has set aside the income from his chemical enterprises for the encouragement of go, through establishing a go educational center and sponsoring the international youth tournament.

Mr. Ing believes the best way to popularize go is to encourage interest among children. On the weekends and during vacations scores of youngsters can be seen romping around the go center. The youngest is six. The writer, a 3-dan, was forced, in a three-game series, to two stones by an impudent nine year old.

Next year Mr. Ing has decided to raise the age limit to 18 and to increase the representation from Europe — each country can send a competitor. The tournament is lots of fun and one of the highlights of international go. If you know of a young person who won't be more than 18 by August 10, 1986 and is about shodan or better, get in touch with your national go association. The local cuisine is superb.

棋聖戰

9th Kisei Title



The champion



The challenger

The 9th Kisei title match saw a clash between polar opposites: Cho Chikun's profit-oriented territorial go and Takemiya's 'cosmic' centre-oriented go. The collision between such contrasting styles led to violent clashes in nearly every game, making the series a very entertaining one for the spectator.

A number of top players predicted that once the series started, Takemiya would play a variety of styles instead of relying exclusively on his patented large-moyo strategy. They argued that his game has matured in recent years and that he shows a greater flexibility than when he was younger. Fortunately for go fans, however, Takemiya stuck to the kind of go that he knows best, going for large moyos at every opportunity. In game after game, Cho was forced to invade the moyo, which meant that the outcome was decided purely and simply by whether or not his group lived. Takemiya attacked with such ferocity that he threatened to usurp Kato's reputation as 'the killer'. When he exterminated large Cho groups in the second, third and fifth games, Cho seemed to be in bad trouble. In the sixth game, Takemiya came within an ace of killing another large group, and it took all of Cho's legendary tenacity to hold him at bay.

In a sense, Takemiya was the hero of the series because of the excitement he generated with the boldness of his centre strategy. At the same time, however, that means that all the more credit must go to Cho for his skilfulness and maturity in successfully coping with a playing style so different from his own. Their Kisei encounter will be long remembered.

Game One

The first game was played in Seoul, making it the first Japanese title match ever played outside Japan. Cho Chikun, of course, is a national hero in his homeland even though he has lived nearly all his life in Japan, and the extraordinary interest shown in the game by the media and the general public testifies to the popularity of go in Korea. His reception at Kimpo Airport when he flew in was like that only accorded to rock

singers in other countries: all work at the airport stopped as everyone rushed to get a glimpse of him. Crowds thronged to the hotel where the game was being played, TV programs analysed the game while it was in progress, newspapers made it the main news item. This kind of saturation coverage of a board game is inconceivable in another country (in Japan, the result of a title match rates a small front-page article in the sponsoring newspaper and a brief mention at the

end of the TV news) and one reason for it was, of course, the national rivalry the Koreans feel with Japan. Poor Takemiya must have felt neglected, but while all the attention must have been gratifying for Cho (when he was still a child in the Kitani school, Cho once confessed to a reporter that he dreamed of going back to Korea as a hero), it also placed a terrible burden on him: if he lost, he would disappoint a whole country.

White: Takemiya Masaki 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun, Kisei & Meijin

Komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each

Played on 16, 17 January 1985 at the Hotel Lotte in Seoul. *Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi Judan.*




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). *Cho takes four corners.*

White 22. If at 'a', Black extends to 'b', and White is left with the weakness at 'c'.

Black 23. Cho already had three corners, so the majority opinion in the anteroom where a number of Japanese professionals (Kobayashi Koichi, Sakata, the referee, and other professionals who had come to Seoul as members of a 'Kisei tour group' organized by a travel agency) were going over the game was that he would jump to 1 in Dia. 1. After giving the matter 63 minutes of careful thought, Cho decided to play 'Cho style', but after the game the players concluded that Dia. 1 was best. Black 1 there, thrusting into the centre, restricts the potential of White's moyo below. As far as fighting spirit is concerned, however, it could be considered that Black 23,

Kisei Title Winners

1st (1977): Fujisawa Shuko (defeated Hashimoto Utau 4-1)

2nd (1978): Fujisawa (d. Kato 4-3)

3rd (1979): Fujisawa (d. Ishida Yoshio 4-1)

4th (1980): Fujisawa (d. Rin 4-1)

5th (1981): Fujisawa (d. Otake 4-0)

6th (1982): Fujisawa (d. Rin 4-3)

7th (1983): Cho (d. Fujisawa 4-3)

8th (1984): Cho (d. Rin 4-2)

9th (1985): Cho (d. Takemiya 4-3)


Kisei Prize Money

Winner: ¥23,000,000 (= \$92,000)


Loser: ¥5,000,000

Match fees, Title holder: ¥7,000,000

Challenger: ¥4,500,000



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

'going my way', is most aggressive.


White 24. Not at 25, as the side area is open below (Black has 'c').

Black 31. So Cho now had four corners. It was almost as if each player had resolved not to disappoint his fans.


White 32. The ordinary move. Sakata half expected White 'd', but after Black 33, White 'e', then Black 'f' would be just right.

White 36 was slack, according to Kobayashi, who felt that 1 in Dia. 2 was superior. Black 39 is a very effective move. White takes sente with 40 and 42, but he is left with a disturbing weakness at 46. He tenukis once with 44, but then feels compelled to reinforce at 46 (the sealed move). If Black had played 45 at 1 in Dia. 3 (next page), White had intended to fight with 2 to 8, but that is obviously not feasible after Black 45.


White 48. White cannot resist: if 48 at 49, Black would cut at 48. Up to 55 in Figure 2, Black secures a territory worth at least 42 points on the left side; White faces an uphill battle to match that with his moyo.



Dia. 3



Dia. 5



Dia. 6





Figure 2 (51 – 100)


Figure 2 (51 – 100). A resolute invasion

White 56. The move that Takemiya regretted the most in this game. Takemiya: 'Extending after cutting is correct shape, but in this case it loses the game. White can't let Black hane at 57. White 56 must be at 57.' That is White 1 in Dia. 4.

Dia. 4. According to Sakata, the moves to 5 would follow. This is quite good for White



Dia. 4



Dia. 7

because the marked stone comes into play. Black also has to add a move at 'a' at some stage.

For 56, Kobayashi preferred the connection at 1 in Dia. 5. He gave the continuation to 5 and commented that would have made the game close.

White 58. Cutting immediately at 60 would be unreasonable – see Dia. 6.

Black 65. Black has broken through the centre of White's moyo. The game is over if he lives with this group, but White's prospects of catching him appear very slim.

White 66 is the strongest answer. If instead White plays at 1 in Dia. 7, Black is virtually immune to attack after 2 to 8. Just for the record, Cho spent 91 minutes on 65 and Takemiya 107 minutes on 66.

White 78. The only move.


White 90. Necessary – if at 1 in Dia. 8, Black links up with 2 to 8 (3 at 7 gives a similar result).

Black 93. A slip – it should be at 'a' to prevent White's cut at 4 in Figure 3.


The sequence from 95 (the move on which Cho went into byo-yomi) on is crude but effective; it sets up the decisive placement at 3 in Figure 3.

Figure 3 (101 – 125). Takemiya starts to catch up.

Black 17 is Cho's second slip. According to Kobayashi, Black should connect with 1 in Dia. 9. White can use the throw-in at 2 to start a ko, but he cannot win it. In fact, Black can live in the



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Ko: 6, 9, 12, 15, 20, 23, 26




Figure 3 (101 - 125)

process of fighting the ko. Black 5, 7 (not at 13, as White plays 7), 13, and 21 are all sente, so next Black can live with 27. White hasn't got time to finish off the ko with 'a', as that would let




In freezing weather (-10°C), Takemiya and Cho pose in front of the Great Southern Gate in Seoul the day before the first game started.

The players

Takemiya Masaki: Born 1 January 1951 in Tokyo. Entered the Kitani school in 1965, became shodan the same year, reached 9-dan in 1977. Won the 31st Honinbo title in 1976 and the 35th Honinbo in 1980.

Cho Chikun: Born on 23 July 1956 in Seoul. Came to Japan to enter the Kitani school in 1962, made shodan in 1968 (at 11, the youngest ever), made 9-dan in 1981. Won the 5th Meijin title in 1980 and has held it since, won the 36th Honinbo title (defeating Takemiya 4-2) in 1981. In 1982 he became the only player ever to hold the top four titles (Kisei, Meijin, Honinbo and Judan) simultaneously.

Prior to this match, Cho and Takemiya had played each other 31 games, with Cho winning 17. The two are sometimes said to have inherited the two contrasting styles of their teacher, Kitani Minoru: Takemiya the high, influence-oriented style of the New Fuseki of the 1930's, Cho the tight, territorial style of Kitani's postwar career.




Dia. 10

Black play first at the top. Following this diagram would have secured victory. (Sakata agreed with Kobayashi's analysis. Apparently Cho overlooked the move at 5.)

In the figure, Black captures two stones and lives, but he suffers considerable damage at the bottom — perhaps as much as ten points. Combined with the enormous thickness White has built on the outside, that gives White a chance.

White 24. Takemiya promptly lets slip the only chance to win he gets in this game. If White made the shoulder hit at 1 in Dia. 10, the game would be very close — a half point either way — and if anything White would have the edge.



Dia. 11

Dia. 12

Figure 4 (126 – 160). Not enough

White 26. If at 38, Black 'a', and White will be ten points behind on the board. White chooses to invade the corner instead, but the unavoidable side effect of his living there is that his centre is reduced.

Black 33 is slack. Black should push up with 1 and 3 in Dia. 11, then make shape with 5. This would give him a safe lead.




Figure 4 (126 – 160)

White 36 exploits the thinness of Black's shape. Black has to be very careful, as his group does not have much eye shape. He can't afford to play a ko with 37 at 46.

Black 43. If at 1 in Dia. 12, the whole group is in danger after White 2 and 4. Attacking the corner white group doesn't help, as 'a' and 'b' are miai for White after 12. This diagram would cause an upset. Despite being down to his last two minutes of byo-yomi, however, Cho answered accurately. The profit White takes up to 44 is not enough for him to catch up.

White 50. Blocking at 51 would make the game a little closer.

White 54. Reinforcing against Black 'b'.

Figure 5 (161 – 200)

White 66. White would not profit by pulling out his stone with 'a'; after Black 'b', White 90, Black would push at 66 in sente. In an emergency, Black can use Black 'c' to make two eyes.

Figure 6 (201 – 240)

This game turned out exactly as predicted: Takemiya built a large moyo and Cho plunged right into the middle of it, precipitating a fierce life and death struggle that decided the outcome. Cho's skill at shinogi (saving groups under attack) turned the game in his favour. He led throughout, and Takemiya failed to take advantage of what chances came his way.

Black wins by 7½ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 24 minutes

Black: 9 hours 59 minutes

(Adapted from the Yomiuri)




Figure 5 (161 – 200)




Figure 6 (201 – 240)
37: at 30; 40: at 29



Cho makes his Korean fans happy by winning the first game. Joining in the discussion are Kobayashi Koichi and Sakata Eio. Takemiya always wears the traditional haori (coat) and hakama (trousers) when playing title matches – the only young player to do so. The game was played in the traditional Japanese manner, but actually this room, part of the presidential suite at the Hotel Lotte, is furnished in rococo style.

Game Two

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played on 30, 31 January 1985 in Nagoya.

Commentary by Hane 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). *Takemiya's grand strategy*


The moves to 11 were played very quickly (four minutes for Cho, 11 for Takemiya), but then Cho spent 65 minutes on 12, making it the slowest move of the game. Though he started with a *niren-sei*, he yielded to his natural instinct to go for territory instead of completing a *sanren-sei* with 'a'.

White 30. Again Cho's inclination towards territory wins out. Another player might prefer to start erasing the moyo, but Cho obviously is unafraid of moyos. Nonetheless, Black 31 is a superb point. After the game the players concluded that 'b' would have been a good point to take with 30.


White 34. A very difficult decision and Cho took 59 minutes to make it. If he comes in deeper, at 'c', for example, Black will attack at 'd'.

Black 35. The sealed move. Takemiya spent exactly one hour on it. This move took everyone following the game (his opponent also?) by surprise. Simply enclosing the moyo with 'e' looks good enough, but that would feel too docile. Black 35 shows a very flexible attitude on Takemiya's part: depending on Cho's response, he is prepared to abandon his moyo strategy.

White 36. White 39, permitting Black 38, would be bad. White 36 at 37 would also be slack:



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

after the sequence to 10 in Dia. 1, White would be left with the weak point at 'a'.

White 42. Too close to Black's thickness: Cho regretted not playing the tighter move at 'f'. The loose move of 42 gave Takemiya the chance to play a superb reducing sequence.

Black 45 and 51 in Figure 2 are related: they are part of a grand strategy to reduce White's territory while also building up strength to use in attacking the white stones in the centre. White has little choice with his answers. If he plays 48 at 1 in Dia. 2, Black lives easily in the corner with 2 to 6.

Figure 2 (51 – 75). *Technician Takemiya*

White 52. White is inhibited by the threat of Black 60.




Figure 2 (51 – 75)

After completing his series of forcing moves, none of which White can resist, Black captures a stone with 63. Takemiya was very proud of the whole sequence from 45 and was convinced that he was winning when he played 63. Ishida Yoshio concurred. In a public commentary on the game, he praised Takemiya as follows: 'By nature Takemiya doesn't like messing around, but here he showed that he has become a superb technician. He has really developed. The sequence to 63 is a great success for Black. He has set up a win. And it all happened in just a flash.'

White 64. To defend against the threat of Black 'a'.

White 66. All or nothing — if the safety-first move at 'b', Black takes the centre with 'c' and wins.

White 70. White is reluctant to answer submissively at 73, so he seeks independent life in the centre.





Figure 3 (76 - 109)


Figure 3 (76 - 109). Disaster strikes.

Black 79. Black's attack begins in earnest. Cho used up the last 41 minutes of his time allowance on 80, but ironically this was an overplay that launched him on the path to destruction. Perhaps his instinct to play all-out all the time betrayed him here. After the game, the players joined with Iwata (the referee) and Hane in working out the peaceful sequence in Dia. 3. This saves the group and keeps White pegging along just a little behind Black.

When Black cuts at 81, White has to hane at 82,




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

7: connects



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

but he meets with a clever counter in 83 and 85. Hane comments that 83 could easily be a bit of a blindspot for professionals. White wants Black to cut immediately at 85, that is, at 1 in Dia. 4. There White is happy to discard the centre stones: he squeezes with 2 to 6, then secures life up to 12. This result would put White back into the game.

White 84. If at 85 (Black plays 86), White might be able to save the centre group, but Black would win on territory.

Black 85 decides the game: White can't live.

Black 93 is a tesuji: if White 95, Black moves out with 'a'.

White seeks eye shape with 96, but his group is helpless after 97. White 96 is a mistake, not because it misses a way to live but because it makes it too easy for Black. Instead, White should try to move out into the centre with 1 to 5 in Dia. 5. He probably won't live this way either, but there would be more chance of pulling off something in the centre.

White 100. If at 101, then Black 100, White 'b', Black 'c', and White cannot connect up to his

group at the top.

White 104 is White's last trick. If Black answers at 1 in Dia. 6, White has the very clever move of 2; after 5, White 6 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'. Takemiya had plenty of time left, so he wasn't going to fall into a trap like this.

This spectacular win for Takemiya greatly stimulated interest in the title match. In the first game, his moyo strategy had just seemed like grist to Cho's mill, but any confidence fans might have lost in Takemiya was more than restored when he routed Cho in this game. It promised to be a very entertaining series.

White resigns after Black 109.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes

Black: 4 hours 40 minutes

(Adapted from the Yomiuri)

Game Three

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Cho Chikun

Played on 6,7 February 1985 in Fukuoka City.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio and Takemiya.





Figure 1 (1 - 43)


Figure 1 (1 - 43). The 'losing' move?

White 6 is an interesting move – usually White would make an approach move in the top right corner. If Black answers 6 by enclosing that corner, White plans to set up a moyo by extending to 7. Black plays 7 to prevent this.


White 18. An overplay: Takemiya didn't realize how severe 19 would be – perhaps he overlooked it because it is bad shape. White gets into such bad




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


15: connects

trouble when Black splits him with 19 to 25 that Takemiya later referred to 18 as potentially 'the losing move'. White should have used it to link up as in Dia. 1 or 2.

Black 25 continues the attack (it forestalls the White 'a-b' combination). White now has two weak groups struggling in Black's sphere of influence. Ishida: 'To say that White is in trouble is an understatement. White is already close to losing.'

White 34. Takemiya: 'I realized that 34 was unreasonable, but if I let Black link up, I lose the game without even putting up a fight. However, when Black attacks with 35 and 37, White is on the verge of collapse. Chikun must have been wondering what was wrong with me. . .'

Black 41 looks natural – actually, it looks like a very strong move – but ironically it lets White off the hook. The correct move is 1 in Dia.



Dia. 5

5: connects

Dia. 6


3. Black just has to play simple moves like 3 and 5 there to maintain the double attack on White. Takemiya admitted that this would be hopeless for White. Switching 4 to 4 in Dia. 4 doesn't help, however; Black makes a severe cut at 5, and after 17 living at the top will not be easy.

When Takemiya crosscut at 42, Cho realized that he had let the fish slip off the line and he began reviling himself. 'Oh no! I've done it again! Idiot!' In contrast to the paltry four minutes he spent on 41, he thought for exactly three hours on 43. This broke Shuko's record in the Kisei title of two hours 57 minutes on one move (against Kato in 1978 — see GW8, page 8). Ishida: 'Cho probably spent two and a half of the three hours reproaching himself for his carelessness with 41. You don't need any time to think about 43. It's the only move.'

Instead of 43, giving atari at 1 in Dia. 5 would be just what White wants. He makes good shape with 2 to 6 and can aim later at attacking Black's eye shape with 'a'. Compare this result to Dia. 3.

Figure 2 (44 – 100). *A moyo materializes.*

White 44. Takemiya spent 77 minutes on this move. The main alternative he considered was to peep at 1 in Dia. 6. This way White captures the three stones, but Takemiya did not like giving Black the ponnuki. Emphasizing the centre with 44 to 48 is more in keeping with his style. In any case, this result makes the game even again. Ishida even felt that White might be a little



Dia. 7




Figure 2 (44 – 100)

ahead.

Black 49. If White cut at 'a', Black would win the semeai, but White would be able to use this aji to attack the top left corner (starting at 'b', perhaps). Black 49 is necessary.


Black 59 starts the second round of fighting. If Black invades one point to the left, White will attack at 'c' and wall off a large territory.

White 64. A good point, but Takemiya wondered if he should have blocked at 67. He disliked the prospect of a black peep at 66 (which would have helped Black settle his invading group).


White 68 is a little slack. The natural move is to descend at 1 in Dia. 7 to attack Black, but Takemiya was worried about Black 2. Later he realized that this would actually be good for White as he could secure the whole bottom area at the cost of sacrificing the corner, which in any case was open to begin with.

Black lives easily up to 75. That puts him back into the game. White stakes everything on his centre moyo with 76 (he commented that if he were winning he would have played at 'd'). Note that using 76 to defend the bottom left corner would lose — Black would reduce the moyo with 76 or 'd'.


White 88. White must go all-out to kill the black group. If he timidly blocks at 1 or 'a' in Dia. 8 (next page), Black will first force with 2, then live with 4. This would be the easy way to lose. Takemiya confessed that he thought there was only a 40% chance of killing Black, but he was relying on Cho's shortage of time.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10




Figure 3 (101 - 132)


Figure 3 (101 - 132). Chances to live

An extremely difficult fight follows. The result was that Cho's group died, but he missed a couple of chances to make it live. This large-scale life and death problem aroused a lot of interest among other professionals; we will introduce some of their comments.

White 2. The vital point.

White 10. Takemiya: 'The only move.'

Black 15. Better to pull out his stone with 1 in Dia. 9. If he plays 3 etc., White cannot stop him from linking up. If White cuts at 'a' after 11, he cannot save his cutting stone after Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. White 'e' is absolute sente, so Black will lose the tail end of his group. Since it is quite a long tail, the game would be close. (Cho went into byo-yomi on 15.)



Dia. 11

White 22. Takemiya (on playing): 'Ouch! That's a strange kaketsugi (diagonal connection). Fool!' As Takemiya realized, 22 was slack. Ishida: 'If White loses, 22 will be the reason. He must push at 25.' Kato Masao and Ohira Shuzo also studied this position and they concluded that Black would probably have died if White had played 22 at 25.

Black 25. Cho's first losing move. If Black pulled back at 1 in Dia. 10, he would live. Takemiya gives the continuation to 19. If next Black 'a', Black is completely alive. Takemiya was overjoyed at getting the chance to strike at 26, but actually even now the group was not yet beyond hope.

In the postgame analysis, it was concluded that Black 25 was the losing move, but a couple of days later Kato Masao came up with the last word on this position. According to him, the real losing

move was Black 31 — if at 1 in Dia. 11, Black could still live. The sequence is a long one, but the reader with time on his hands may care to follow it out. It is not surprising that Cho, in byo-yomi, did not see it.

Dia. 11. Cutting at 5 sets up an eye in gote at 'a', so White 10 is necessary. The moves to 11 are all forced. White 12 is then the strongest attack, whereupon the sequence to 27 is also forced. If then White 28, Black puts the corner into ko with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. Black has plenty of ko threats in the neighbourhood, so this is bad for White. If White plays 28 at 'e', Black kills him with 'c'.

After White 32 the group is dead.




Figure 4 (133 - 165)

Figure 4 (133 - 165). All over

White 42 wraps up the game. Black plays on not in expectation of a slip by White but in order to prepare himself for acknowledging defeat.

Figure 5 (166 - 204). 'Takemiya the killer'

White 100. If at 91, Black gets a ko with 100. White gains in the exchange to 104.

Cho blew two chances of winning this game after taking a lead in the fuseki and after making his invasion of White's moyo. Ishida: 'This is the worst way to lose. Psychologically it is easier on you to lose if you haven't been in the lead.'

The extermination of the large group in this game, following on the slaughter in the second game, began to earn Takemiya a reputation as 'the killer'. He did his best to live up to it.

Black resigns after White 204.




Figure 5 (166 - 204)

99: at 95; 103: at 91

Time taken, White: 7 hours 58 minutes

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes

(Adapted from commentaries by Ishida in the Yomiuri and Takemiya in 'Kido', April 1985.)

Game Four

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played on 21, 22 February 1985 in Sapporo.

Commentary by Ohira Shuzo 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1 - 31). Dubious 3-3 strategy?

White 2 and 4 are a pattern that Cho plays once every Kisei title match, but it was criticized by




Figure 1 (1 - 31)

Ohira. 'Against a player like Takemiya, who, with his 'cosmic style', plays all his stones as high as he can, the double 3-3 strategy seems dubious. The shoulder-hit of 15 is perfect, so 4 would be better placed at 15. Up to 21, Black has played on a grand scale. He has scored points in the opening. In this position, probably eight out of ten professionals would prefer to take Black.'

The first 31 moves were played in exactly 31 minutes, an extraordinary pace for Cho. He must have resolved to avoid getting into time trouble again after what it cost him in the third game.




Figure 2 (31 - 65)

Figure 2 (31 - 65). *A short-lived moyo*


Black 31. A thoughtless move, much regretted by Takemiya. White is able to use the cut at 36 to slice through the middle of Black's moyo. Black 31 should be at 35, that is, 1 in Dia. 1.

Dia. 1. If White 2, Black 3 is perfect. Black 7 is also severe. Next —


Dia. 2. If White 8, White's group is forced to wander aimlessly through the centre. Therefore —

Dia. 3. White will answer 1 with 2 here, but the result is also good for Black.


On the first day of a game, the Yomiuri newspaper lets a number of readers (chosen by lot) into the playing room to watch the game for half an hour or so. When Cho played 44, a collective sigh escaped from the group. This spontaneous reaction was understandable — the professional readiness to sacrifice stones is one of the hardest points for an amateur to grasp, especially in a case like the present one, where the stones




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

in question seemed to have played such a valuable role in puncturing Black's moyo.

White could, of course, easily save the stones by attaching at 1 in Dia. 4, but he would then have to drag out a heavy group. Black would get a nice attack going with 4 and 6.

White 46. At this stage Cho began to revert to his usual pace — 85 minutes for the move.

White 52 is slack. White should first attack the group on the left with White 53; if Black 59, he could then play 52 and still aim at attacking Black. The lead switches hands again when Black plays 53.

White 58. The sealed move. Time taken for the day was 5 hours 20 minutes by Cho and 1 hour 58 minutes by Takemiya.

Black 61. Shuko advocated attaching at 'a'. If White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e' follow,

White would probably have to play 'f' next to prevent Black from attacking at 'g', so then Black could attach at 'h', getting a result obviously superior to that in the figure.




Figure 3 (66 – 100)

Figure 3 (66 – 100). Takemiya overconfident

White 66, 68. White has to make sure of his second eye after Black 65.

Black 71. Ohira wanted to see 'a' first. One of Takemiya's weaknesses is that when it comes to positional judgement he's an optimist – a slight lead looks like an easy win to him, so he tends to relax the pressure when he's in front. White 72 actually makes the game quite close.

Figure 4 (101 – 150). Takemiya falls behind.

Black 3 is too small. Black should first attach at 'a' – if White 24, he can exchange Black 4 for White 23, then switch to 3. The presence of Black 'a' and Black 4 would limit White's invasion with 8 to 'b' (if at 8, Black would capture him with 'c').

Black 7 is also too small. Takemiya: 'Black 7 is a trashy move – it's virtually the losing move. Having played 3, I should have surrounded the centre with 'c'. (Instead of 'c', Shuko and Ohira recommended 'b' and 8 respectively, but they agreed that Black would probably have won but for 7.) Black has no counter to White 8.

White 30 and 32 are big: they make 70 in the next figure sente. The outcome is now decided.

White 34. Cho went into byo-yomi.

White 40. Winding the game up.




Figure 4 (101 – 150)




Figure 5 (151 – 200)

100: ko

Figure 5 (151 – 200), Figure 6 (201 – 271)

The moves in these figures have no effect on the outcome. Despite being in byo-yomi, Cho played with the precision for which he is noted – he is probably without peer in the endgame.

This game was quite a contrast to the first three, in that there was almost no fighting. For Takemiya, it was a painful loss, considering that the game had looked like a comfortable win for him early in the middle game (after Cho let him recover from his atypical mistake in setting up his moyo), but that balanced the books with his lucky win in the third game.

The best-of-seven match was now down to a best-of-three. No one was making any predictions:




Figure 6 (201 - 271)

Ko (at 2): 5, 8, 11, 14, 17; 22: ko (above 19); ko (at 2): 24, 27, 30, 33; 35: at 19; 38: above 19; 40: at 2; 42: retakes (above 41); 43: below 2; 46: at 2; 47: at 28; 48: connects (below 2); 49: at 41; 52: above 41; 54: at 41; 71: ko (left of 68). Black wins and connects the ko.

Cho was undoubtedly buoyed up by his 'Cho-style' half-point win, but Takemiya was gaining more and more confidence in the power of his moyo strategy.

White wins by ½ point.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes

Black: 6 hours 34 minutes

(Adapted from the Yomiuri)

Game Five

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Cho Chikun

Played on 27, 28 February 1985 in Toyama City.

Commentary by Sakai Takeshi 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1 - 50). *Takemiya off to a good start.*

Black 1, 3. Not often seen from Cho.

Black 27. The ogeima leaves the invasion point at 36, but the kogeima at 'a' gives White an excellent extension at 'b'.

White 28. For once Takemiya plays quietly instead of going for a moyo with 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'. The sequence to 32 is a preliminary to the 3-3 invasion of 36. Black builds thickness with 37 to 43, but that thickness is already counteracted by White 28 to 32.

White 44, 46. Takemiya was satisfied with his




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

opening.

When Takemiya played 50, Cho was upset. 'Terrible! Terrible! That's where I should have played.' White 50 was in fact the last large fuseki point, and Cho should not have let Takemiya take it. Sakai advocated playing Black 47 at 'f', forcing White 'g', then extending to 'h' or 'i'. In his opinion, there was no need for Black to worry about White attacking his bottom right group.

Figure 2 (51 - 73). *Takemiya gets into his stride.*

White 52, 54. Takemiya style, building thickness and glowering menacingly at 51 from a distance. Sakai style is to cap immediately at 59.

Black 57. Cho Chikun style, taking maximum




Figure 2 (51 - 73)

profit and leaving his weak group to fend for itself. His fellow professionals disapproved of 57, however, as the exchange for 58 hurts 51 and 55 too much (better would be jumping into the centre, to the right of 59). When Takemiya blockaded with 60 and 62, he thought that the game was his.

White 68. Overdoing things. Takemiya expected 71 at 'a', in which case he planned to reinforce his group below with 'b'. Betraying this kind of facile assumption is Cho's forte.

His bottom left group was now looking vulnerable, but Takemiya switched to 72 at the top. This Sakai praised as a 'superb move'. He and the other players following the game had only looked at moves such as 'c' and 'd', but 72, with its follow-up at 'e', is much superior. Of course, playing tenuki at the bottom gave Black the chance to make a very severe move at 73, but Takemiya was prepared to fight.




Figure 3 (74 - 100)

Figure 3 (74 - 100). Cho seizes the initiative.

White 76. Without the 68-71 exchange in Figure 2, White could now peep (at 71), then move out with 79.

Black 77. The sealed move.

White 92 is careless: it should be at 98. Black 93 destroys his eye shape, in sente.

Figure 4 (101 - 129) In trouble?

Black 1. White seems to be in trouble. Takemiya commented that Black's attack was painful for him, but Sakai questioned this. 'Black 93 and





Figure 4 (101 - 129)



Dia. 1

99 (in Figure 3) are a loss for Black. White gained five or six points here. All he has to do now is to escape. I wonder if Takemiya really found this painful.'

White 6. White plays to the limit, but 6 is a little risky because of the defects in White's position on the right. White should just play 6 at 8; if then Black 7, White could play 'a' or 'b' and he would have a slight lead.

Black 7. Black cannot cut - see Dia. 1.


Dia. 1. If Black cuts at 3 (after exchanging 1 for 2), White counters with 4 and 6; if Black 7, White destroys him with 8 to 16.

White 8. White can't answer 7: if White 9, Black 'c' is sente, after which Black can below 2.

Black 15. Apparently Cho felt that he was behind, so, after 84 minutes' thought, he staked the game on this attack.

White 16. If at 27, Black separates the two groups by attaching at 'd'.

Black 17. Black 1 in Dia. 2 (next page) would be big, but White would then capture three stones with 2 and 4. The thinness of his centre group



Dia. 2

makes Black prefer to avoid this.

Black 21, 23. White cannot resist because of his bad aji at 'e' and 'f'.





Figure 5 (130 - 153)


Figure 5 (130 - 153). *A setback for Takemiya*

White 30. Takemiya: 'There were only three moves - 40, 30, and 39 - and I chose the worst.' The correct move is White 1 in Dia. 3. If Black cuts with 2, White sacrifices and squeezes up to 13, then defends his cutting point with 15. This way White wins. Ironically, Takemiya spent 76 minutes on 30, but he blames the dinner break for upsetting his train of thought. White 30 seems to offer the best eye-making potential, but there is a pitfall.

Black 35. Takemiya suddenly realized that he couldn't give atari at 37 as he had been planning. The ko in Dia. 4 follows. Black 4 there is sente thanks to White's diagonal connection (30 in the figure). White is forced to change course with 36 and 38, but his position is hopeless after 41 and 43.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

White 52 is swallowed up by Black 53, but the latter move, though the strongest counter, becomes the spark that sets off an explosion. Simply connecting at 'a' would be safer.





Figure 6 (154 - 174)

Figure 6 (154 - 174). *A nightmare ending*

Black 55. The losing move: it should be the cut at 59.

Black 59. Now it is too late: the continuation to 74 is forced. Black's centre territory is destroyed.

In retrospect, Sakai pointed out that Black could have cut at 59 with 49 in sente. If White ignores him, Black gets a ko with 3 to 9 in Dia. 5. White would therefore have to answer Black 1 at 5. This would leave Black about ten points ahead on the board.



Dia. 5

2: *tenuki*

An interesting sidelight is that the sequence from 53 to 74 was 'predicted' by Sakata Eio. In a public commentary given at the Nihon Ki-in while the game was still in progress, Sakata, after first noting that the game was hopeless for White, hypothesized the moves from 53 as a possible way for Takemiya to stage an upset. He of course didn't expect Cho to go so badly wrong and was astonished when the identical sequence appeared in the game. Cho was in byoyomi, but usually that doesn't bother him. This ending must have seemed like a nightmare. There were tears in his eyes when he resigned.

Up to 130, this was an excellent game for Takemiya — without 130 it would have qualified as a masterpiece — so when the result was reported in the Yomiuri the next day as an 'upset victory for Takemiya', he was indignant. The way he saw it, Cho's blunder just gave the game its rightful result.

Black resigns after 174.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 59 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes.

(Yomiuri Newspaper)

Game Six

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played on 3, 4 March 1985 at Atami.

Commentary by Rin Kaiho, Honinbo.

This game was yet another large-scale struggle, with a large Cho group fighting to survive inside a Takemiya moyo. If Takemiya could kill it,

he would be Kisei; if Cho could get away, the series would go the full distance. The contrast between the styles of the two protagonists could not have been presented more dramatically.





Figure 1 (1 - 34)



Dia. 1

Figure 1 (1 - 34). Questions of style

White 20. If at 'a', then Black 21, which Cho did not want.

White 24. Cho: 'I should have played at 25.'

White 28 is submissive: it makes 27 a good forcing move. If White hanes instead at 1 in Dia. 1, Black will cut off this stone with the forced sequence to 10. After exchanging White 11 for Black 12, White would probably switch to 13. Later he would hope to get a chance to play 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'. This diagram is playable, but Cho's style is to defend solidly with 28 and store up strength.

White 30 - 34. These five moves, the highlight of the fuseki, illustrate vividly the contrast between Cho's territorial go and the 'Takemiya natural style'. First of all, White 30 is an ex-

cellent point which would be the instinctive choice of most players. A sufferer from 'moyo phobia' might want to jump to 31 with 30, but Black would be very satisfied to make an approach move at 'b' (if White 'c', then Black 'd').





Figure 2 (32 - 56)

Figure 2 (32 - 56). Both sides happy

White 32 is the inimitable Cho style. However, he is extending an open invitation to Takemiya to play his favourite kind of move, which the latter promptly does with 33. This readiness to let the opponent play his natural style indicates formidable self-confidence on Cho's part, but still Takemiya must have been feeling happy when he saw his moyo beginning to take shape with 31 and 33. Rin commented that he would prefer to press at 'a' with 32, even though that would let Black invade at the top (probably by attaching at 'b'), as 'a' would stop Black's moyo before it got off the ground. Rin surmises that White 'a' is just not the kind of move that appeals to Cho. The latter did comment, however, that perhaps he should have omitted 32 and played directly at 34, so he did recognize that the 32-33 exchange is not desirable for White.

White 34 shows Cho's flair for detail. White 'c' is virtually a joseki in this position, but then Black 'd' would work well in expanding Black's moyo. Incidentally, if White defended at 'e' on the left with 34, Black would be bound to play at 34 himself; if then White 'f', Black further expands his moyo with 'g'.

White 36. Instead of trying to link up to the



Dia. 2

16: ko

Dia. 3

top, White wants to live independently on the side. He achieves his aim up to 52, but Black also builds a wall on the outside. Probably the two players were equally satisfied with this development.

Black 49. If White cuts at 'h', Black intends to answer at 'i'.

Black 55 (the sealed move) is mandatory: connecting at 56 would be bad, as White would gouge out the side with 'j'. The Yomiuri reporter, Mihori Sho, writes that while waiting for the sealed move Rin Kaiho worked out the continuation in Dia. 2. After 20, 'a' and 'b' are miai for Black. After Rin left the room, Yamabe (the referee) came in and worked out exactly the same sequence. The two agreed that the result was good for Black. However, the next morning Yamabe reported that while lying sleepless in bed he had thought of an improvement for White, which consisted of simply playing 11 at 1 in Dia. 3 (if next Black 'a', then White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'). This is exactly what Cho did — perhaps there was some mental telepathy going on. The result is obviously better for White than Dia. 2, as his middle top position has not been damaged by the moves from 12 to 20.

Figure 3 (57 - 100). Fighting for life

Black 67. Takemiya of course goes for the centre instead of the top with 'a' in Dia. 3. That forces Cho to invade at 68, so another epic struggle gets under way.

Black 69. Black would lose if he capped at 'a' (White can also reduce the moyo with 'b' at the top).

White 70. White seems to have an uphill struggle ahead of him. It's not enough just to live — he has to stop Black from solidifying too much territory in the process. White's main asset is the aji of 'c' after 73.

Black 79. Black would like to attack at 80 (the 'shape' move), but apparently a hane at 90 would




Figure 3 (57 - 100)





Figure 4 (101 - 120)



Dia. 4

make it easy for White to settle his group.

White 86, aiming at the black group below, is aggressive. After the game, Rin and Yamabe commented to Cho that they thought White 1 in Dia. 4 would have got life quickest, but Cho replied that Black 2 and 4 gave him an unattractive result. Black 'a' next is big, and Black can also play 'b' in sente, enabling him to attack the corner with 'c'. However, Cho later recognized that White 1 would have been safer.


White 88. White 89 is still better.

Black 89 should have killed the white group, but Takemiya went wrong later on.

Figure 4 (101 - 120). *Takemiya lets slip the Kisei title.*

Black 3. A clever answer to the peep at 2. It gives Black the threat of 'a' for later.

Black 5 should be at 1 in Dia. 5. That would make it impossible for White to get two eyes in this area, while he would be unable to get a




Dia. 5

second eye on the right side with 2. The group would die. Takemiya didn't play 1 because he was looking too far ahead. In the event that he attacked the four marked white stones later, he didn't want White to have the option of playing White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', or, alternatively, White 'd', Black 'a', White 'e', Black 'b', White 'c'. But this worrying was unnecessary — all he had to think of was attacking the large white group. Actually, instead of 2 here —


Dia. 6 (next page). White would be able to get an eye by flailing about with 2 etc., but this way Black would win. After forcing with 'a', he could capture the bottom right corner.

Black 7. The second mistake — if Black attacked immediately at 9, that is, at 1 in Dia. 7 (next page), White would not be able to get the ko that follows in the game.

Dia. 7. If White 2, Black plays 3 to 7; if then White 8, Black cuts off the main body with 9, but



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

if White 8 at 9, he can't get an eye on the edge after Black 8.

Takemiya's attack on this large Cho group brought him as close to becoming Kisei as he was fated to get. Two moves — 5 and 7 — let the largest fish of all slip off the hook.

Figure 5 (121 — 160). *Alive at last*

Black 21. Black cannot block at 22 — see Dia.





Figure 5 (121 — 160)

37: connects; ko: 44, 47, 50



Dia. 8

8.

Dia. 8. White either lives with 2 or can use it to launch a counterattack if Black keeps trying to kill him. After 5, the moves to 16 are forced, leading to disaster for Black. White can even aim at White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.

When Black takes the vital point of 21, White cannot get a second eye here, but with 26 etc. he gets a ko on the right edge. To set up this ko, White has to sacrifice the bottom right corner by permitting Black 31, but even though killing the group with 55 is worth about 33 points, that is a price White can afford to pay. Living with the centre group decides the game.

Black does not have enough ko threats. Capturing with 58 gives White some compensation for the loss of the group below.




Figure 6 (161 — 200)




Figure 7 (201 - 261)

25: connects (left of 11). Black wins and connects the ko (at 58).

Figure 6 (161 - 200). White ahead

White 62 and 64 confirm White's lead.

Figure 7 (201 - 261). Cho evens the series.

Yet again Cho showed that he is most formidable when he has his back to the wall. The greater the tension the greater his powers of concentration. In this point Takemiya has something to learn from him. The latter had taken the lead twice in the series but had been unable to do anything with it. The stage was now set for the final showdown.

White wins by $4\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 47 minutes.

(Adapted from the Yomiuri)

Game Seven

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played on 19, 20 March 1985 at the Fukudaya Inn in Yotsuya, Tokyo. Commentary by Sakata Eio 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1 - 35). Takemiya aims for the centre.

White 14 is a patient move. If at 'a', Black would get greater thickness than in the game with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

Black 17 is a little unusual. Presumably Takemiya's reason for avoiding the joseki move of 1 in Dia. 1 is that Black develops into the centre too slowly. The moves after 17 show that he is more concerned with the centre than with the side.

Black 21. Black could also cut at 1 in Dia. 2.







Figure 1 (1 - 35)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

The result to 14 is equal.

White 22. White should extend at 'e'. If Black 'f', White could then head for the centre with 'g'; if instead Black 'h', White could make good shape with 'i'. In contrast, Black gets good shape with 23 and the 20 - 21 exchange becomes bad shape for White.

Black 35. The sealed move. It was predicted by the professionals following the game. Black could attach on top - Dia. 3 results - but 35 is more aggressive. (Just for the record, the players were, for the first time, almost equal in time consumption on the first day: 3 hours 9 minutes for Takemiya to 3 hours 18 minutes for Cho.)





Figure 2 (36 - 70)



Dia. 4

Figure 2 (36 - 70). The losing move?


White 36 looks like an abrupt change of plans on Cho's part; if one is going to jump to 36, the 34-35 exchange is better left unplayed, as it is aji-keshi (destroys aji). Presumably Cho had planned to jump out to 1 (or 'a') in Dia. 4 but changed his mind because of the prospect of a severe attack by Black with 2 and 4. Even so, having to abandon 34 could not have made him very happy.

Black 37 is severe. White would like to answer at 45, reducing Black's moyo, but that would invite a counterattack with Black 44.

Black 43, 45. Black goes for thickness. At this stage Takemiya was probably satisfied with his position.

Black 47 was criticized as too easygoing. Black is so strong at the top that White cannot invade deeply even if 47 is omitted - 'a' is as far as he could venture. Sakata advocated invading at 1 in Dia. 5 instead of 47; if White 2, Black can choose among 3, 'a' and 'b' next. Ishida Akira favoured the ogeima at 59.

White 50. Cho takes his fourth corner. This




Dia. 5

undoubtedly sets a record for the number of corners he's taken in one series.


Black 57. Perhaps the losing move. A lot of time was devoted to looking at it after the game. The main idea to emerge was that Black should have followed up his probe at 55 by doing something on the side. Two possibilities are playing at 'b' and 'c'. The fighting that follows in either case is so difficult that no definitive conclusion was reached, but it does seem that Takemiya's approach with 47 and 57, expecting to win without fighting, was a mistake.

Black 59 and 61 were a resolute response to the cut, but apparently Cho had already read out that he won, by 1½ points, when he played 62. He devoted 54 minutes (most of his remaining time) to his analysis, muttering frequently: 'The moment of decision has come.' After the game he commented: 'If my judgement was wrong, I was prepared to lose.' Ishida Akira observed that in this kind of position a really top-flight player could, with enough time, read out the result, but that doing so in less than one hour was a superhuman feat. Takemiya, on the other hand, seems to have misjudged the position. He seems to have believed that taking all the centre with 67 and 69 was enough to win.

Black 67. It might seem that Black would gain by giving atari at 68 before playing 67, but that is not so. Ishida Akira, the Yomiuri commentator, pointed out that in that case White would attack at 4 in Dia. 6. The continuation there shows what would happen if Black kept on resisting. The semeai after 28 is hopeless for Black. Ishida was sure that Cho had read all this out.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7




Figure 3 (71 – 100)

Figure 3 (71 – 100). Calculations made

White 74 and 76 show that White is confident of victory. He could win by a big margin if he invaded the moyo at 'a', but there is no need to take the risk. Cho had obviously satisfied himself that reducing with 78 was good enough. His decision made the final game atypical for the series.

White 80. The last large yose point.

White 86. Cho went into byo-yomi.

Figure 4 (101 – 159). Territory beats moyo.

Black 23. Sakata thought the game might have been closer (i.e. a half-point win for White) if Black had played 21 at 38.

White 44. Not at 1 in Dia. 7. Black gets an approach-move ko up to 12.

Cho's strategy of avoiding complications was vindicated by the result. In a sense, this game, with its lack of fighting, was a bit of an anticlimax to an unusually bloodthirsty series, but in another sense it represented the victory of




Figure 4 (101 – 159)

Cho's territory over Takemiya's moyo. Takemiya played so well throughout, however, that the series served to enhance his reputation. Cho was probably the only player who would have been able to hold him in check.

If Takemiya gained in stature, then so did Cho. The most impressive aspect of his play was his self-confidence, as expressed in his willingness to let his opponent play his favourite strategy. A less stout-hearted player might have tried to interfere with Takemiya's moyo-building, but Cho welcomed the opportunity to indulge his own partiality for profit.

Takemiya was not cast down, as witness a comment he made after the game: 'I lost to Chikun, but in that I played my own style of go I am satisfied.' A few days later he commented to Shuko: 'It's just as well I lost. If I had won, my go might have stopped making progress.'

Cho's final comments: 'My feelings on finishing this series can be described in one word: exhaustion. When every game is a life-and-death struggle,

it takes something out of you.

'I didn't mean to play that kind of go. I was shaken by the refinement of Takemiya's centre play, but I also felt unable to draw back, I felt that I had to go all-out for profit. I played a seven-game series with Takemiya four years ago in the Honinbo title, but the impression I got of his centre strategy this time was completely different. On the former occasion, I felt that Take-

miya still hadn't completely mastered the art of playing in the centre. In this series, his magnificent centre strategy gave me a profound appreciation of the universality of the game of go.'

White wins by 1½ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 34 minutes.

(*'Kido'*, May 1985. Kisei report translated by John Power.)



Cho triumphs in the final game. Seated watching are Ishida Akira, just visible over Takemiya's shoulder, Kato (arms folded), Kudo Norio and Rin.

Cho Chikun: Between Japan and Korea

In the April 1985 issue of the Japanese 'Playboy', there was a very interesting article, entitled 'Homecoming', on Cho Chikun's visit to Seoul for the first game of the Kisei title match. Written by Sawaki Kotaro, a freelance writer and friend of Cho's of a decade's standing, the article throws light on his rise to the top in Japan and on his ambiguous role as a national hero in Korea – ambiguous because he has lived in Japan most

of his life and speaks Japanese better than Korean. Below is a summary of some of the more interesting parts of the article.

The story of Cho Chikun's arrival in Japan at the age of six to enter the Kitani school is well known, as is the record he set by becoming professional shodan at the age of eleven. What is not so well known are the circumstances

surrounding his departure from Korea and his adoption of a new homeland. The key figure in this move was his older brother, Cho Shoen.

The father of modern professional go in Korea is Cho Chikun's uncle, Cho Nam-chul 9-dan (born 1923). Nam-chul's father worked in a Japanese bank — Korea was a Japanese colony from 1910 to 1945 — but was passed over for promotion in favour of Japanese employees. To console himself, he took up go — on the go board he didn't have to defer to anyone. His eldest son participated in an anti-Japanese student movement, but was arrested and tortured by the Japanese, with the result that his health was destroyed. His father suffered a revulsion against education, because it had only brought misfortune to him and his son — Japanese was the compulsory language of education in Korea then — and refused to send his other two sons to school. The middle son, Cho Chikun's father, suffered from this, for it meant that he did not acquire any professional qualifications. The third son was Nam-chul, whom his father taught to play go.

In his early teens, Nam-chul played a teaching game with Kitani Minoru, who was passing through Seoul on his way to China. Kitani urged him to come to Japan to join his school, which he did in 1937. When the war ended and Korea was liberated, he returned home and devoted himself to spreading go. Single-handedly, he established go on an organizational basis for the first time in Korea (in contrast to Japan, go in Korea had mainly been a gambling game and was looked down upon by the upper classes). Under his leadership, the Korean Ki-in (Hanguk Kiwon) was founded and the first newspaper tournament was established in 1956.

The middle brother had four sons, of whom the eldest was Cho Shoen and the youngest Cho Chikun. Shoen (b.1942) learnt go from his grandfather. When he became a professional at the age of 15, he was written up in the national newspapers — there were still relatively few professionals in Korea at that time. By the time he was 18, he had become the number two player in Korea. In 1960, then 4-dan, he challenged his uncle, unsuccessfully, for two of the three newspaper titles then in existence. He decided that the only way to further his career was to go to Japan, but his parents, whom he supported, opposed this decision, as did Nam-chul, who refused to introduce him to Kitani. He went regardless. At first,



Cho Shoen 5-dan

he lived in Kobe and studied at the Kansai Ki-in, but when Kitani heard that a nephew of Cho Nam-chul was in Japan, he invited him to come to Tokyo and enter his school. In 1963 he joined the Nihon Ki-in as a 2-dan.

Unfortunately, studying at a hothouse of go talent like the Kitani school soon made him realize that he was already too old to have any chance of reaching the top in Japan (fellow disciples at this time included Otake, Kato and Ishida Yoshio). It was then that the idea of bringing his youngest brother to Japan occurred to him. Chikun had already learnt go and showed aptitude for the game, but he was only five years old. Shoen calls his decision 'the gamble of a lifetime'.

Shoen had to win over both his parents, who must have been aghast at the idea of giving up a five-year-old, and the Japanese Ministry of Justice, which had to issue a visa for the child. Shoen made daily treks to the ministry to plead his case. After five months of hard work he won both battles, and little Chikun arrived in Japan on 1 August 1962, aged six years and one week, just in time to participate in the 100-dan (i.e. the dan total of all the disciples) celebration of the Kitani school. (He played Rin Kaiho, then 6-dan, a game on five stones and won. The game is given in GW22, page 28.)

Shoen's life then became devoted to his younger brother, to the task of rearing a champion. For a year the two lived together, then Chikun moved into Kitani's house with the other live-in disciples. There were times Chikun was overcome by homesickness and other times when he rebelled against the hard regime of study. Once, when

Chikun was about ten, Shoen recalls sending him flying because he wouldn't study. Sobbing, the child rushed at him with fists flailing. 'Why did you bring me to Japan? No one asked you to. Let me go home, now!' At that, Shoen reflected that, having deprived him of his parents and his home, he certainly had no right to beat the child. Perhaps this was about the time that Kitani was seriously considering sending Chikun back to Korea, a plan which might have been put into effect if he had not made shodan when he was eleven. The stories of Cho Chikun's willpower and application as a child are well known, but he must have also been very lonely.

Cho Chikun became completely imbued with his brother's sense of destiny for him. The author, Sawaki, first met him when he was an 18-year-old 5-dan, and when he congratulated Cho on his recent promotion to that rank, the latter replied with what has become one of his famous quotes: 'I didn't come to Japan to become 5-dan.' In the same vein was his answer to a request for an interview: 'Please wait until I am Meijin.'

That came six years later, at the age of 24. Shoen's extraordinary gamble had paid off. In the meantime, Shoen has become more of a businessman than a go player (though last year he scored the first success of his go career in Japan by winning the 5-dan section of the Kisei title). When Chikun became Meijin, he told his brother that he would help him to earn money in any way he could. One way is the Cho Chikun fan club that Shoen set up in Seoul. It has an office with eight employees and publishes a magazine and collections of Cho's games.

Earlier we referred to the ambiguity of Cho's position as a national hero in Korea. The ambiguity, of course, reflects the contradiction in the attitude towards Japan of modern Korea. On the one hand, the animosity derived from the colonial experience dies hard; on the other, Japan is a role model for Korea because of its successful modernization. Whenever Cho visits Korea, he is lionized by the media, and there is always a big contingent from the Korean press covering his title games in Japan. Cho is a hero because he is a Korean beating the Japanese at the game at which they fancy themselves supreme. But though he is a Korean, as a go player he is a product of the Japanese go world. He has lived in Japan since he was six, he speaks Japanese far better than



Cho Nam-chul 9-dan

Korean (as a child he attended a Korean school in Tokyo, so he can handle conversational Korean, but to all extents and purposes his 'native tongue' is Japanese), and, to cap it all, he married a Japanese girl. In any encounter between Cho Chikun and Cho Hun-hyun, the top player in Korea, Koreans would prefer to see the latter win. Actually, however, Cho Hun-hyun also studied in Japan, from 1963, when he was ten, to 1972, when he returned to do his compulsory military service, so he is also 'tainted'. (Apparently he was given a rough time in the army because of his Japanese associations.) The favourite of the Korean go public is Suh Bong-so 8-dan, who is purely a local product. He is Cho Hun-hyun's main — in fact, only — rival in the newspaper tournaments, but is usually bested by him (the two have met in 39 title matches, of which Suh has won only 9).

The second point that complicates Cho Chikun's position in Korea is the bad relations between his brother and the Korean Ki-in. Cho Shoen retained his membership of the Korean Ki-in after he went to Japan. Ten years ago, there was a quarrel between the chairman of the Ki-in and the professionals (the reason for the quarrel is not given in the article), and the latter, led by Cho Nam-chul, broke away from the Ki-in. Cho Shoen, together with a small minority of the players, sided with the chairman. The professionals were indignant, considering this a betrayal, and after the Ki-in gave in and the quarrel was patched up, with a new chairman installed, they expelled Shoen. He countered by organizing the Cho Chikun fan club in Seoul after his brother became Meijin. It was this club that

arranged to hold the Kisei game in Seoul; officially, the Korean Ki-in ignored the game, which meant that no Korean professionals attended any of the official functions, though Cho Hun-hyun and others came to the hotel to follow the game. Cho Shoen and his uncle are still not on speaking terms, and unavoidably some of the antagonism towards Shoen glances off on Chikun. The latter let slip to Sawaki that he was bitter about some unpleasant remarks made to him by the chairman of the Korean Ki-in when he paid a courtesy call before leaving Seoul.

Cho Shoen also told the author about another incident that left an unpleasant taste in Chikun's mouth. In 1981, when Chikun made his first trip home after winning the Meijin title, he was greeted as a national hero and decorated by President Chun. He also played two games with Cho Hun-hyun, the first a two-day game for a newspaper, the second a TV fast game. After he won the first game, someone from the Korean Ki-in approached Shoen and requested that Cho Hun-hyun be allowed to play black in the second game regardless of the draw (i.e. nigiri). Cho Hun-hyun's forte is playing with black, on top of which it is generally considered that it is an advantage to have black in a fast game, as it's easier to play an attacking game intuitively than a defensive one. Shoen was sure Chikun would not agree, but his response was to say, with some bitterness: 'If they want to beat me so much, let them do what they like.' Chikun won the game by 5½ points.

Cho Chikun has an absolute loyalty to his brother, all the stronger because inevitably his relations with the rest of his family in Seoul have become distant (he spent very little time with them during his visit). When told about how the Korean Ki-in was criticizing Shoen for 'using'

What's in a name

In this article, Cho Chikun and Cho Shoen are referred to by the Japanese pronunciations of their names, but the Korean pronunciation is given for other Koreans. Chinese, Japanese and Korean names are all written with Chinese characters, the pronunciation of which was modified when adopted into Japanese and Korean. Below is a chart of the respective pronunciations of the Korean players well known in Japan.

Korean	Japanese
Cho Chi-hun	Cho Chikun
Cho Sang-yon	Cho Shoen
Cho Nam-chul	Cho Nantetsu
Cho Hun-hyun	So Kungen

Note. The surnames of Cho Chikun and Cho Hun-hyun are pronounced the same in Korean but are written with different characters.

him, his reaction was to say: 'If my brother can use me, he's welcome to as much as he can . . . He's my only blood relative, in effect.'


Sawaki also has some sympathetic comments on the predicament of someone who achieved his lifetime ambition at the age of 24. He speculates that it must be getting harder and harder for Cho to psych himself up for title matches, since he has nothing new to aim at. He thinks that that might help explain not only why Cho started off so badly in last year's Meijin match, losing the first three games, but also why he then fought so well: with his back to the wall, he suddenly had a target and the sense of crisis that brings out the best in him.

(Adapted from 'Playboy', April 1985, by John Power.)

Life and Death Problem

The diagram on the right represents Takagi Shoichi 9-dan's attempt to compose a problem with as few stones as possible. It's unlikely there's ever been a problem with fewer stones on one side than Black has here. Can you find the one move that enables Black to live?

Answer on page 55.



Black to play and live

NEC Japan-China Super Go

The NEC Japan-China Super Go series turned out to be much more exciting than the sponsors in even their more optimistic moments could have expected. This was thanks to the skill and fierce fighting spirit of one man, Jiang Zhujiu (formerly spelt Chiang Chu-chiu in GW), who shocked Japanese go fans by toppling one after another the first five members of the Japanese team. His defeated opponents were all past or current members of the Honinbo and Meijin leagues, which marks them as the professional elite in Japan; one was a former title-holder.

This series consists of a team knockout tournament, with eight players on each team and with each player playing until he is defeated. Before the tournament began, there was speculation in Japan that the Japanese team might only have to field half its members – with luck, some said the Chinese might get as far as Ishida Akira.

That illusion was quickly shattered, but then Jiang had not seemed a likely threat. Last year he was only ranked number 15 in China (though he had been 4th the year before), but by the time he had single-handedly disposed of the larger part of the Japanese team, he had become a hero in his homeland. In order, he defeated Yoda 5-dan, Kobayashi Satoru 8-dan, Awaji Shuzo 9-dan, Kataoka Satoshi 7-dan, and Ishida Akira 9-dan. Fortunately for the Japanese, they were able to check the onslaught when they brought the first of their heavy guns to bear, in the shape of Kobayashi Koichi, but it is unlikely they will ever underestimate the Chinese again. In this report, we present two of Jiang's games.

Jiang v. Kataoka

White: Kataoka Satoshi 7-dan

Black: Jiang Zhujiu 7-dan

Komi: 5½; time: 3 hours each.

Played on 6 February 1985 in Shanghai.

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko.





Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50)


Black 35. Shuko criticized Jiang's strategy. He advocated moving out with Black 1 etc. in Dia. 1. Black keeps sente, so next he can switch to 35. Giving White the ponnuiki at 42 is painful. However, Shuko also criticized White 38 as being

too thin. If White extended solidly at 39, Black would have to connect at 'a'. White could then play 42 and if next Black attacks with 'b', turn at White 41. That is superior to being forced down to the second line with 40.


Black 45. The simplest, and best, answer to



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

White's attack is to live with Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f', Black 49, White 50, Black 'g'. This is sente, forcing White 'h', so next Black could switch to 'i'.

White 48. Kataoka misses a chance. He should cut at 1 in Dia. 2. If Black 2, White forces with 3 to 7, then captures the black group with 9. If Black saves the group by playing 6 and 8 in Dia. 3, White attacks the one on the side with 9. Either way, White could have taken a commanding lead.




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

The sequence to 62 is good for White, but with 64 he commits a strategic error that changes the flow of the game. The key point of the whole board is 65, and White lets Black take it. If Kataoka had played 64 at 1 in Dia. 4, the moves to 4 would follow, after which White could play 5. Black would probably play 6 next (this is such a good point that White might consider playing there with 5), so White could then reinforce with 7. This result would be quite a contrast to the sequence to 68 in the game.

Black 69. Jiang now leads the game into the infighting that is his forte. In most of his wins, he crunches the opponent in the middle game. Here also he lays the basis for victory.


White 70 helps Black to get sabaki. White should pull back at 'a'; Black would then attach at 'b', but White could be content to answer him quietly at 'c', the idea being to let Black live in gote, as then White could switch to 87 on the left. White 70 indicates a willingness to fight the ko after 71 to 75, but Black is happy with the result to 85.

White 86. White is already behind, but this move makes it worse as it gives Black a perfect move at 89. White should have come in as far



Jiang Zhujiu

Jiang, age 23, was born in Shandong province, but now lives in Taiyuan City in Shanxi province. His elder brother, Jiang Mingxiu, is also a go player (currently 6-dan) and toured Japan in 1978, scoring 3-4, and in 1982, scoring 6-1. Jiang Zhujiu toured Japan in 1980, when he scored 6-1, and in 1982, when he scored 7-0 (his opponents were mainly 4-5-dan professionals and amateurs, so these results were not as startling as they sound).



Dia. 4

as 89.

White 96. An outright invasion of the moyo would have little prospect of success.




Figure 3 (101 - 135)
5: connects

Figure 3 (101 - 135)

Black turns his moyo into territory up to 15. The question now is how much of the bottom area White can secure. He goes for the maximum with 18 and 20, but he has a lot of bad aji. When Black invades, killing him seems to be too much to hope for.

Black 33. If at 'a', Black would be unconditionally alive.

Figure 4 (136 - 169)

White gets a ko up to 48, but Black has plenty of adjacent ko threats. The best that White can




Figure 4 (136 - 169)
51: ko

come up with is 52, but Black disposes of this last attack calmly and methodically. White crumbles in the face of his counterattack with 67 and 69. The reader can confirm for himself that White's own group perishes if he persists in trying to kill Black.

White resigns after Black 169.

('Igo Club', May 1985)

Jiang v. Ishida Akira

White: Jiang Zhujiu 7-dan

Black: Ishida Akira 9-dan

Played at the Nihon Ki-in. Published in the June 1985 issue of 'Igo Club'.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)
39, 42: ko

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White 18. A move invented by Shuko - the joseki was 'a'.

Black 21. Black 'b', provoking White 'c', would help White to make good shape on the left side. Black is content to let White build up strength with 24 to 32, as he can counteract it with 33.

White 34. Starting the ko determines the nature of the game. White 40 is the only real ko threat on the board for either side, so White wins the ko, but the majority opinion (including that of Ishida Akira) was that the result to 45 was good for Black.

Black 47. Lacking in fighting spirit, according to Ishida, who regretted not making a hane at 48 (he hypothesized the sequence Black 48, White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f', Black 'g').




Figure 2 (51 - 100)
98: ko

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Black 51 - 61. In retrospect, it appears that Ishida was misjudging the overall position at this stage. He thought that he just had to build central thickness to keep a lead, but this sequence gives away too much profit. The ordinary joseki with Black 51 at 'a', White 62, Black 'b'; White 52, Black 'c' would be better. If then White 'd', Black could switch to 'e' at the top, which is an enormous move.

Black 69. Too slow - better at 'e'.

White 74, 76. A severe counterattack.

White 80. Jiang thought that this would be sente: the move to continue the attack in the centre is White 'f'. Black strengthens the centre with 81, but at the cost of permitting White 82.

White 100. White should cut immediately at 'g'.

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

White 10. If White connects at 1 in Dia. 1, Black will take sente with 2, then switch to 4. Black still has the threat of a ko with 'a', so White would have to add a stone. This result is uninteresting for White. If instead he plays 1 at 'b', Black has a troublesome probe at 'c'.

White is confident of winning the ko, but Black is happy to compromise with 15 and 17.

This very complicated fight finally reaches a conclusion with 35, and the surprising result is that all the groups involved live, unlikely though that seemed at some points. In theory, a ko remains at 'a', but starting it would be too risky






Figure 3 (101 - 150)
14: ko



Dia. 1

for Black. The game is even.

White 38. The honte is 1 in Dia. 2, but presumably White is afraid that that may not be enough. White 38 leads to some interesting complications, in the midst of which Jiang gets his chance. He is at his best in positions like this.



Dia. 2





Figure 4 (151 - 196)
89: ko (at 83); 92: ko (at 84)



Dia. 3 11: connects

Figure 4 (151 - 196)

Black 51 is probably the losing move. The cut looks natural, but after White's clever counter with 52 to 56, Black is forced to give up the two stones. If he leads them out with 1 to 5 in Dia. 3, White counters with the cut at 6. After 10, White 'a' is sente, so next White can jump in at 'b', giving Black a terrible result. Instead of 51, Black should just have defended at 71, making miai of 51 and 77.

Black has little choice but to switch to 57. Up to 69 he gets a seki, but losing the two stones 51 and 55 loses the game.

Black 83. Preparing to resign.

This was an impressive win for Jiang. Ishida




Ishida Akira

Akira made no really bad mistakes, yet Jiang managed to direct the flow of the game in his favour. His winning streak was now five in a row – not bad for a player who had dropped to number fifteen in China last year. In appreciation of his efforts, the China Weiqi Association promoted him to 8-dan and gave him a hefty rise in salary.

Black resigns after White 196.

Correction to Sacrifice Tesuji Problem



White to play


A perceptive reader has noticed a mistake in the solution to one of the sacrifice tesuji problems given in GW34. In the answer to Problem 2, given on page 53 of GW34, we gave Black 1 in the diagram as the tesuji for saving the seven captured black stones. The only counter for White we looked at was 'a', but Richard Shiffrin of Indiana University has found a much better answer for White. Before looking at the actual correction, how about trying to find the revised solution yourself?

Answer given on page 49.


Basic Fighting Techniques

Miyazawa Goro


The three problems below all involve the same tesuji, one which is perhaps more advanced than those covered so far in this series. It is well worth learning, however, as it enables one to secure life in seemingly hopeless positions.



1. Black to play (6-kyu)




2. White to play (4-kyu)
Answers on page 41.




3. Black to play (2-kyu)

Three Trick Moves


Abe 8-dan



1. Black to play



2. Black to play



3. Black to play


The drawback of the one-space formation is that it is open at the side. If White tries to exploit this weakness by making submarine attacks as in the above three problems, how should Black respond in each case?

Answers on page 42.


Tesuji Magic

Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan

The tesuji problems below require a leap of the imagination to solve, but they should be within the reach of kyu-level players who are prepared to put their minds to solving them. If the obvious move doesn't work, try changing the timing.




1. Black to play and live.




2. Black to play and kill White.


Answers on page 44.



3. Black to play and live.



4. Black to play.



5. White to play.




Answers on page 45.

Practical Tactics and Tesujis


Rin Kaiho 9-dan

In each of the problems below, the players have to make an important tactical decision, one that will have a big influence on the subsequent flow of the game. If confronted with these problems in actual play, how would you deal with them?



1. Black to play

White 1 is a troublesome cut. What is the best way for Black to deal with it?



2. Black/White to play


In this position what is the best move for each side?

Answers on page 47.


Basic Fighting Techniques: Answers

Pattern 22: The Squeeze (shibori)

The squeeze is one of the most basic and most enjoyable techniques of go. There is nothing like the satisfaction of reducing an enemy group to a heavy, useless clump of stones through a series of sente sacrifice moves. The squeeze is one of the most effective means of destroying the opponent's eye shape and is also very useful in creating eye shape for oneself.




Illustration



*Dia. 1
4: connects*

Illustration. There is only one way for Black to win the semeai.

Dia. 1. When Black squeezes with 1 and 3, he gets enough liberties to win the semeai with 5.




1. Black to play

Black can kill White — a ko is not good enough.


Dia. 1. Black 1 is wrong; instead of connecting, White seizes the opportunity to play a ko by making the throw-in at 2.

Dia. 2. Black 1 is worse, as it lets White live unconditionally.


Dia. 3. Black 1 is the vital point. White captures it with 2, but Black can squeeze with 3. Black then destroys White's eye shape with 5.




Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: worse




Dia. 3: correct




2. White to play

Black has made a mistake in the joseki, then compounded his error by ignoring the marked white move. What does White do now?

Dia. 1. Making the clamp at 1 is a mistake. Black plays 2 and 4 and the result is that White has just helped him to fix up his shape. Confirm for yourself that if White switches 3 to 4, Black can descend at 3.




Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2: the tesuji

Dia. 2. The diagonal move of 1 is the tesuji. Black must atari at 2, so now White can squeeze with 3. Next —

Dia. 3. White takes away the corner with 5 and 7 and threatens Black's security. The merit of this result for White is that when Black plays 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', he can hane at 'd'. Instead




Dia. 3



*Dia. 4
5: connects*

of 4 in Dia. 2 —

Dia. 4. Answering at 1 would be disastrous: White takes much more of the corner.




3. Black to play


This problem involves quite a lot of reading. What happens if Black tries to save his stone on the edge?

Dia. 1. Sometimes the 1-3-5 combination works, but not here. Black has not crawled enough.


Dia. 2. Black crawls one more time with 5,




Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2: correct



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

then cuts with 7. Next —

Dia. 3. This well-known sacrifice tesuji sets up a squeeze —

Dia. 4. Enabling Black to win the fight after 4. If next White 'a', Black wins with 'b' to 'e'.

Dia. 5. Playing 1 here instead of 6 in Dia. 2 does not work. White has no chance of escaping. If White 7 at 'a', Black presses at 'b'.

(‘Gekkan Go’, October 1979)


Three Trick Moves: Answers Continued from page 39

Answer to Problem 1


Dia. 1. Black 1 is the most timid response: it gives White an open invitation to invade at the 3-3 point. In the sequence to 8, White takes all the corner profit. This is bad.

Dia. 2. Black 1 looks tougher, but still it gives White an excellent follow-up at 4. This result is even worse than the previous one.


Dia. 3. Black should not be distracted by the marked stone: defending the corner with 1 is the




Dia. 1: timid



Dia. 2: worse



Dia. 3: correct




Dia. 4

right response. It may look slow, but when Black calmly takes up position like this, it is surprisingly difficult for White to find a good continuation. Next —

Dia. 4. If White 1, Black attacks with the pincer at 2. In an emergency, Black can always make two eyes in the corner, so the fight looks good for him.

Dia. 5. If White defends on the right side with




Dia. 5


1, Black launches a strong counterattack at the bottom with 2 and 4. White cuts at 5, but he cannot save the two stones.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. White has intruded more deeply into the corner, so this time Black 1 is inadequate – rather than being calm, it is now submissive.




Dia. 1: too calm




Dia. 2: defects

Dia. 2. Counterattacking with 1 also looks dubious. The sequence to 8 creates too many defects in Black's shape.


Dia. 3. Attaching on the inside at 1 is correct. After 3 –



Dia. 3: correct



Dia. 4: solid



Dia. 5: variation


Dia. 4. White 1 creates cutting points, but White has to worry about his own connection first, so Black has time to reinforce with 4 and 6. He now has nothing to worry about. If White plays 1 at 3, Black exchanges 4 for 5, then connects at 1.

Dia. 5. If White counters with 2, Black can be content to capture a stone with 3 and 5. This gives him a good, thick shape.


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Defending at 1 lets White make good shape with 2 and 4. Black can now attack on the right, but he has given up too much at the bottom.


Dia. 2. Black 1 is insipid. Black can capture the stone but at the cost of giving White a series of forcing moves. This is painful.




Dia. 1: bad




Dia. 2: submissive



Dia. 3: correct



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Dia. 3. When White makes the deep invasion, Black 1 is a good counter. If White 2, Black 3 prevents him from linking up. Next –

Dia. 4. The best White can do is to live in gote up to 5. This does not hurt Black. He can now choose whether to attack on the right or at the bottom.

Dia. 5. If White extends the other way with 2, Black must block at 3. White will attempt to link up with 4, but Black can confine him to the corner with 5 etc. Black is satisfied with the outward influence he gets up to 11.


(‘Let’s Go’, June 1984)

Tesuji Magic: Answers Continued from page 39



Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. The atari at 1 shows a refusal even to think about the problem. It leads nowhere.

Dia. 2. Black is now on the right track, with the throw-in at 1, but he's got the timing wrong. White is untroubled.



4: connects



Dia. 3. Black must start out with the cut at 1.

Dia. 4. White has no choice but to answer at 2, so now the throw-in works. After 4 —






Dia. 5. White cannot connect.

Dia. 6. Preventing the throw-in with 2 does not work because of White's shortage of liberties.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black decides to repair the defect in his own shape first, but that lets White live with 2 and 4.

Dia. 2. The problem for Black is that whether he defends at 'a' or 'b', White can play 'c' in sente and so live. Obviously, Black has to change his approach.



Dia. 3. Black 1 works both ways, destroying White's eye shape while also preventing him from attacking Black. White must defend against Black 'a', but then Black spoils his second eye.


Dia. 4. Note that counterattacking with 1, usually a tesuji in this shape, does not work as White cannot atari.

Dia. 5. Defending at 2 works no better for


White. Black in turn defends with 3 and next 'a' and 'b' are miai.

Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Simply trying to live is useless: Black does not have enough room.




Dia. 1: dead



Dia. 2: wrong timing

Dia. 2. Black 1, trying to exploit the defects in White's shape, is the right idea but lacks a little in execution. When White ataris on the right at 2, Black's attack fails to help him secure life.

Dia. 3. Black tries to set up a semeai with 3 here instead of cutting at 4, but he ends up one liberty behind.




Dia. 3: Black loses


Dia. 4. Black must change the timing and cut first at 1 here. Next —

Dia. 5. If White 2, Black captures the stones above with 3 and 5. If White goes for the same semeai with 'a' etc., he ends up on the losing side this time.


Dia. 6. White plays 2 to save the stones above, but now Black wins the semeai with the three stones on the bottom edge (if White 'a', Black 'b').



Dia. 4: correct



Dia. 5: Black wins




Dia. 6

Answer to Problem 4


Dia. 1. The diagonal move at 1 does not work: this is not the vital point.

Dia. 2. Nor is the cut at 1. After 5, White 6 prevents Black from doing anything. Next —


Dia. 3. If Black hanes at 1, White just cuts at




Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: wrong



Dia. 3




Dia. 4: correct

2 — if Black 'a', White 'b'.


Dia. 4. Striking at 1 is the crucial move. If White 2, Black continues with 3. Next —

Dia. 5. If White 1, Black hits him with 2. If White continues to resist, he loses fourteen stones.



Dia. 5


5: connects




Dia. 6

Dia. 6. Cutting at 1 does not work either. If White connects at 3, he loses everything.

Dia. 7. If White answers 1 at 2, Black cuts at 3, making miai of 'a' and 'b'.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Dia. 8. White's last resort is to atari at 2, but this likewise proves ineffectual. Once Black strikes at the vital point of 1, White is helpless.


Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. It takes a bit of ingenuity to find the solution to this problem. First of all, bluntly pushing through at 1 obviously fails. After 2, White 'a' is refuted by Black 'b', while White 'c' is countered by Black 'a'.


Dia. 2. Wedging in at 1 is a bit more subtle. If Black answers at 2, White succeeds with 3 and 5. However, Black need not be so generous.




Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: wrong for Black



Dia. 3: fails




Dia. 4: fails

Dia. 3. The correct answer to 1 is Black 2. White's attack now fails.


Dia. 4. White tries a different tesuji with 1

and 3, but this also fails when Black counters with 4. However, White 1 is the vital point, as was demonstrated in Dia. 3. The problem is to make the right follow-up.




Dia. 5: correct


Dia. 5. White must continue by taking the second vital point of 3: his failures in Dias. 3 and 4 have at least shown the way. Next —



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Dia. 6. If Black ataris at 1, White connects at 2 with atari and Black cannot escape. Instead —

Dia. 7. If Black 1 here, White gets a snapback with 2.


Dia. 8. If Black connects at 1, White traps him with 2 and 4.

(‘Let’s Go’, April 1984)

Practical Tactics and Tesujis: Answers Continued from page 40

Answer to Problem 1

Sometimes clashing head-on with the opponent can lead to a disastrous result. In such cases, it is worth looking for an effective way to make a sacrifice. How does this apply to the present problem?




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. The natural impulse of the kind of player who hates to give up any of his stones will be to play 1 and 3 here, but that gets Black into a lot of trouble. Black has no answer to White 4.


Dia. 2. If Black 1, White uses the throw-ins at 4 and 8 to squeeze and capture the whole group. This is the worst possible result for Black.

Dia. 3. Black 1 here is a little better, as it gives Black a chance to defend at the vital point



Dia. 2


7, 11: connect




Dia. 3

of 3. However, White can use the sacrifice tesuji of 4 to get a satisfactory result. Black can do better.

Dia. 4. Sacrificing the stone with 1 to 5 is a considerable improvement. The result here is reasonable, but actually White has not played



Dia. 4




Dia. 5


correctly. Instead of 4 –

Dia. 5. White 1 is good style: it prevents Black from sealing off so much of the corner.


Dia. 6. Black should follow the proverb and increase the sacrifice to two stones.



Dia. 6: best



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Dia. 7. The moves to 7 are forced. Black achieves his aims of sealing off the corner and building outside thickness, all for the small cost of two stones. He can be satisfied. Next –


Dia. 8. Black can use his thickness to press at 1. This is quite a difference from Dia. 3.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. The problem for White is whether he can capture the black group if he has first move. White 1 does the job; White 'a' instead would, of course, let Black live with Black 1.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Resisting is futile. Black 'a' is gote because of White 'b', so Black cannot counter-attack.

Dia. 3. The problem for Black is to find the best move for securing life if it is his turn to play. Black 1 looks like the natural move, but –



Dia. 3




Dia. 4


Dia. 4. It helps White to make thickness with 2 to 6. That in turn weakens Black's corner position to the left. (For 5 at 'a', see Dia. 6.)

Dia. 5. Black 1 looks like good shape, but it also has drawbacks.


Dia. 6. White can play the 'tsukekoshi' (cutting across the knight's move) tesuji of 2. If Black resists with 5 etc. he only hurts his left-corner




Dia. 5



Dia. 7



Dia. 6



Dia. 8

position. If Black plays 5 at 7, White ataris at 8, giving a similar result to Dia. 4.

Dia. 7. Black 1 looks slow, but here it is the best move. It is calm and solid and denies White forcing moves.


Dia. 8. If White attaches at 2, Black can simply ignore him and switch elsewhere. The comparison

with Dias. 4 and 6 makes the merits of this approach apparent. White gets less thickness and Black's corner position on the left is not adversely affected. That being so, playing at 2 is not going to be very attractive for White.

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'*, August and December, 1980)

Correction to Sacrifice Tesuji Problem Continued from page 38

Richard Shiffrin's suggested counter to Black 1 is White 2 in Dia. 1. We submitted it to Michael Redmond 4-dan for adjudication. Below are his comments.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2. White links up his stones and captures the black group with 2. Black can try to cut with 5, 7 and 9, but White 8 is a tesuji putting Black in shortage of liberties. White 6 at 14 doesn't work: see Dia. 3.


Dia. 3. White 6 is a mistake. Black forces from 7 to 11, then makes the key move at 13.

The conclusion is that Black 1 in Dia. 1 does not work, and so the problem is false.


While he was about it, Michael also found an improvement on Black 3 in Dia. 2, though not one that saves the seven captured stones.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Black 2 is the strongest move. If White plays 5 at 6, Black wins with Black 5, White 9, Black 7. Against 6, White connects with 7 and 9 and wins the semeai by two moves, but territorially this is the most profitable way for Black to play.

32nd Oza Title

Yamashiro made a bad start, losing the first game of the 32nd Oza title (given in GW39), but he still had two chances, since the Oza title was changed to a best-of-five match last year. Yamashiro is a good all-round player and is perhaps best known for his tenacity in the middle game. Unfortunately, however, he met with such tough opposition from Kato that he did not show to best advantage.

Game Two

White: Yamashiro Hiroshi 8-dan

Black: Kato Masao, Oza

Played on 4 October 1984 in Numazu City.

Commentary by Kudo Norio 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1 - 50)


Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Black 17. A resourceful move. If Black plays the 'shape' move at 'a', he is afraid that White might switch elsewhere. Black 17 has a good follow-up at 'b', sealing White in, so White feels compelled to play 18. However, that lets Black stake out positions on both sides with 19 and 21, so his strategy has succeeded. That provokes White into attacking at 22.

White 22. White is, of course, hoping for the result in Dia. 1, where the marked stone ends up right on the vital point. The usual move for scooping out the base of this kind of formation is 1 in Dia. 2, but now intercepting at 2 works well. The continuation to 8 isolates the marked white stone.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Black 25 and 27 take profit on the side, at the cost of giving White a free hand in the centre.


White 28. A difficult decision: White goes for centre thickness, but he could also go for the side as in Dia. 3. Either way, Black is not distressed.

White 36. More subtle than playing the atari at 37.


The result to 39 seems slightly favourable for Black. White 12 is almost helpless, while the black sacrifice stones in the centre still have a lot of aji.

Black 41 virtually secures the bottom left sector. To forestall this, Kobayashi Satoru advocated jumping to 'c' (aiming at 'd'), though that would invite a severe attack by Black at 'e'.

Black 45. Alternatively, Black 'f' would reinforce Black's thin position with 13, 17 and 21.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

White 54. If at 1 in Dia. 4, Black can get an approach-move ko.

Black 69. If at 74, Black would have no trouble escaping, but the game is already going well enough for him. If a large-scale fight develops, Black's defect at 'a' might become a burden.

White 70. White is hoping for a chance to cut at 'b'. If the game were going well for White, he






Figure 2 (51 - 100)



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

would answer 69 with 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', but he can't afford to let Black secure all the top area.

White 78. A superb point, combining attack and defence, of a kind that does not come up often in one game. Kato was dismayed to find that, though he had done well in all the fighting so far, 78 made the game quite close. He should have played 77 at 78; since the white group is weak, White 'f' would seem obligatory, so Black could next hane at 'g'. Presumably Kato was worried that White would answer Black 78 at 77 and then successfully parry any attack on his group.

Black 79. A painful necessity after 78. Normally, the sequence in Dia. 5 would be Black's privilege in this position, but 78 gives White the option of changing tack as in Dia. 6.

White 80-86. Compared to Dia. 5, Black has lost 5 or 6 points. That makes the game very close.

Figure 3 (101 - 155)

Black 1. Black has to watch out for the threat of White 'a' to 'g', which reduces him to one eye.

White 8. To forestall Black 'h'.



Yamashiro Hiroshi 8-dan

Born in Yamaguchi prefecture on 12 August 1958. Became a disciple of Shimamura 9-dan in 1965, made shodan in 1972, reached 8-dan in 1982. First attracted attention in 1978, when he not only entered the 4th Meijin league at the record age of 20 but started out by defeating two of its strongest members, Sakata (who won the league) and Rin. His final score was 3-5, so he was eliminated, but he made comebacks in the 5th (scoring 2-6) and 10th (current) leagues, in addition to winning places in the 39th (4th on 4-3) and 40th (score 3-4) Honinbo leagues. He has also won the Okan (crown) title (open to players at the Nagoya branch of the Nihon Ki-in) four times. He toured China in 1978 and 1983.




Figure 3 (101 - 155)

51: connects (at 38)

White 28. The late middle game and endgame are supposed to be Yamashiro's forte, but ironically he lets the game slip here. White 'i' is bigger than 28: Black 29 to 33 secure the game for Black. He is now a comfortable ten points ahead.

Yamashiro failed to make the most of his opportunities in this game, but on balance Kato played much better, so he deserved his win.

White resigns after Black 155.

Game Three

White: Kato Masao

Black: Yamashiro Hiroshi

Played in Nagoya on 19 October 1984.




Figure 1 (1 - 34)


Figure 1 (1 - 34)

Black 11. An interesting point. Black 11 and 13 work well with the Chinese-style pattern to build up Black's moyo, but making an approach move at 14 takes priority. The reason is that White has a low position at the top with 2 and 10, so Black 14 would keep it low. White 14, in contrast, turns the top into a well-balanced formation. If Black played 14, White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd' would probably follow.


Black 17. Kato expected 'e', which he planned to answer with White 18; Black 'f', White 30, Black 'g' would follow.

White 18. If at 19, Black achieves his aim of making shape with 'e'. Giving up the corner is better for White.

White 30. Playing at 2 in Dia. 1 instead gives Black a superb result at the bottom up to 12.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 2 (35 - 70)


White must fight with the 30-34 combination.

Figure 2 (35 - 70)

Black 37. More severe than simply jumping to 'a'. White's answer at 38 looks natural, but it gives Black a good continuation at 39, exploiting White's shortage of liberties. Kato commented that he should have blocked at 1 in Dia. 2. After 2, Black 4 is necessary, so White can make good shape with 5. Black could then switch to 44 in the figure, but still this result gives White better shape than in the game.

Black 43 is bad: Black must enclose the corner with 44. White is unlikely to jump to 43 himself, as the exchange for Black 'b' might well help Black more than White, so 43 is not urgent. Invading at 44 gives White the edge. (If Black had played at 44, White would have set about reducing his moyo with 'c'.)

White 50. Too heavy, according to Kato — it should be at 'd'. With 51, Black threatens to get back into the game.



Dia. 3

White 54 and 56 aim at 'e'.

Black 61. Black must keep White separated by blocking at 68. Once White links up at the bottom he has the game sewn up. Kato gives the sequence in Dia. 3. After White 4, Black 5 to 9 work well. If White next flees with 10, Black plays 11, which makes Black 'a' sente because of the threat of Black 'b' (White answers at 'c', followed by a throw-in after Black 'd', but he needs the liberty at 'a' for this). In this result, Black not only reduces White's territory but also builds useful thickness.

Black 69. If at 'f', White would not mind giving up three stones with White 'g', Black 'h'.




Figure 3 (71 - 100)

Figure 3 (71 - 100)

Black 81. Alternatively, Black could invade at 'a', leading to White 'b', Black 'c', White 88, but White would also feel confident this way.

Black 93. White is actually grateful for the

chance to solidify his position with 94 and 96 as he was still worried about the aji of the marked black stone.

Black 97. If Black continues in the top left corner, he can get a ko, but further play there would only help White to secure the rest of the top area.

Black 99. Jumping in aggressively at 'd' might be better.





Figure 4 (101 - 138)

Figure 4 (101 - 138)

White 4, 6. Kato: 'Overdoing things - simpler to defend at 13.'

White 10. A good move - Dia. 4 shows that Black can no longer get a ko in the corner.

White 16 is bigger than rescuing the three stones.



Dia. 4

Figure 5 (139 - 176)

Black 39. Probably Black is just looking for a place to resign.

Black resigns after White 176.

Yamashiro's first title challenge turned out to be a bit of an anticlimax after his superb performance in defeating players like Rin and Cho




Figure 5 (139 – 176)
60: at 54; 64: at 46

in the elimination rounds. The general feeling was that he was a little nervous and unsettled. He could console himself by recalling that Kato made eight unsuccessful challenges before he finally picked up his first title, but he cannot be confident that he will get as many chances. When congratulated on his convincing victory, however, Kato joked that Yamashiro might repeat the Kataoka pattern in the Tengen title – the first time Kataoka lost three straight but the second time he took the title.

(‘Kido’, Dec. 1984. Translated by John Power.)

Voice Recorder 361

Konishi Taizo 6-dan

Nessie’s Face

In the 1984 Women’s Honinbo title, the challenger, Honda Sachiko 6-dan, took revenge for her setback the previous year, defeating her younger sister Kusunoki Teruko 7-dan two straight and resuming her place in the seat of honour. The Women’s Kakusei also saw these two clash in the final. In recent years, women’s go has been dominated by the three Honda sisters (the eldest sister is Sugiuchi Kazuko 8-dan).

While playing, the sisters look stern and severe, but as soon as the game is over the atmosphere becomes friendly and cheerful again.


There was an animated discussion after the

second game, with Rin Honinbo, Takemiya 9-dan, Kamimura 7-dan and Sato Masaharu 8-dan joining in. (Honda was white.)


Dia. 1. Black has an imposing framework, but confronting White with 1 was problematical. White 2 would give Black an ideal result with 3 and 5, enabling her to dominate the whole board. But things won’t work out this easily. White played 2 at 3, so the game continued with each side reducing the other’s moyo.

Rin Honinbo: ‘It’s always a difficult problem to know how far to go with 1.’

Kamimura 7-dan: ‘How about Nessie’s face?’
Everyone was speechless.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2


Dia. 2. Black holds back to 1. White 2 next is reasonable, so Black expands his moyo with 3.

Kamimura: 'I guess Takemiya would be very happy with this.'


Takemiya grinned: 'Yes, it feels good.'

Black 1 in *Dia. 1* leads to mutual reduction, 1 in this diagram to a territorial contest — and Black is developing on the larger scale; *Dia. 2* best fits this position: such were the conclusions. Of course, the outcome is still to be decided.

But what is this 'Nessie's face'?



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

I don't know who gave it the name, but the shape like a sake bottle in *Dia. 3* is called the 'dog's face'. Going one space further with 1 in *Dia. 4* is the 'horse's face'. The even bigger nose of 1 in *Dia. 2* is apparently called 'Nessie's face'. Incidentally, Black 1 at 'a' in *Dia. 3* is the 'cat's face'. Go professionals have a unique approach to naming shapes. Of course, neither the 'dog's face' nor the 'horse's face' is in the *Dictionary of Go Terms* published by the Nihon Ki-in.

Later on in the game, White pressed at 1 in *Dia. 5*, so Black made a severe counter with 2 and 4 and seemed to go into the lead. Simply jumping to 4 would have been good enough for White; if she had reduced the middle, she would have had a good game.

Takemiya: 'White 1 is a putt that's a little too



Dia. 5

strong.'

Presumably he means that White is trying a little too hard. Rin, Takemiya, Kamimura, and Honda are all regular participants in the Nihon Ki-in golfing competitions.

Here are a few more go terms used by professionals.

When playing in an area where one does not have much at stake, for example, when playing a probe inside enemy territory: 'Anyway, it's at government expense.' Osaka professionals, in referring to a territory that can be reduced more than it appears in the yose, say: 'You can bargain the price down, so it's nothing special.'

There are many others. The ability to use go terminology accurately is proportionate to one's go strength; these terms coined by professionals are ever more difficult — the wrong nuance and they seem funny. The safest thing in any field is not to imitate the code words used by professionals.


('Kido', November 1984)

Life and Death Problem: Answer


Dia. 1. Black 1 is the only move. White 2 is the strongest attack, but Black has a strange counter with the two-step hane. Confirm for yourself that whatever happens Black captures at least one of the white stones and so gets his second eye.

Dia. 2. Black 1 (or 'a') does not work. White kills him with 2 to 6.

('Kido', March 1985)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

10th Tengen Title

One of the mysteries of the past decade has been the ‘hibernation’ of Ishida Yoshio. He has been so subdued that it is hard to recognize in him the player who in his twenties dominated the tournament scene and was recognized as the top player of his generation – no mean feat when that generation includes Kato and Takemiya, his fellow members of the renowned ‘Kitani trio’. The other two have been more prominent recently, but neither has yet equalled Ishida’s feat of simultaneously holding the Meijin and Honinbo titles in 1974 (before there was a Kisei title). Perhaps Ishida lost his ‘hunger’ for titles after reaching the top so quickly or perhaps he concentrated on enjoying life. At any rate, whenever reproached for his lack of success, his response was to say that he was ‘overhauling’ his game and to predict that he would make a comeback in his forties. Since he is still only 36, he has silenced his critics a couple of years ahead of schedule.

Ishida’s opponent in the Tengen title match was a player with a style very similar to his. Kataoka plays a strongly territory-oriented game; his forte is calculating the territorial balance and, like Ishida, he is a solid endgame player. The clash between the two was, not surprisingly, billed as ‘the new-model v. the old-model computer’. (One welcome by-product of his win for Ishida is that it should put an end to all those jokes about ‘out-of-order computers’ that have been made about him in the go magazines.) Kataoka commented before the match that he looked forward to playing Ishida because in his youth he had greatly admired Ishida’s go.

Kataoka’s defeat in the title match cost him his unique place as the only non-9-dan with a title, but he still remains the only member of the post-Cho generation to have won a title. By holding the Tengen title for two terms, he has achieved more than most players do in a lifetime.

Game One

White: Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

Black: Kataoka Satoshi, Tengen

Komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

Played on 1 November 1984 in Muroran City, Hokkaido. *Commentary by Kataoka (interviewed by ‘Kido’ magazine).*




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). Not enough territory

Kido: That’s an unusual pattern in the bottom

left.

Kataoka: I thought that answering 16 with 17 gave me a reasonable game.

Kido: Black 27 doesn’t help White?

K: It strengthens White, but he already has thickness here. . . If Black answers 26 directly at 33, White counters with White 37, Black 36, White ‘a’, then aims at pushing up at ‘b’ and cutting.

Kido: Is it true there was something wrong with Black 39?

K: I had to attach at ‘c’. If White ‘d’ and Black 39 follow, that makes a big difference to the corner territory. I fell right behind because of White 40 and 42.

Kido: What about White 44, running head-on into the black stone?

K: If White plays 46 immediately, Black connects at 48, and White 44, Black ‘e’, White ‘f’, Black ‘g’ follow. If White answers Black 48 with ‘e’, Black plays ‘h’.

Figure 2 (51 – 103). A close game

Kido: You don’t often try to surround the centre, do you?

K: I’m way behind in territory in the corners and on the sides. If White omits 60, Black attacks at ‘a’.

Kido: Someone said that 73 was thin.






Figure 2 (51 - 103)



Dia. 1
6: takes



Dia. 2

K: Correct shape is cutting at 93, then giving atari at 84 when White plays 96. Black takes sente after White 'b', Black 'c', White 74, but I guess White 78 would still give me a bad result.

Kido: White 94 was terrible, wasn't it?

K: Kato Oza's opinion was that White should simply capture with 1 in Dia. 1. The result to 7 is good enough. If Black plays 2 and 4 in Dia. 2, White captures; if then Black 6, White answers with 7 and 9. Because White fell short of liberties in the figure, Black 101 and 103 became possible. This finally made the game close.

Figure 3 (104 - 150). 'I had a chance, but...'

Kido: Wasn't White 26 small?

K: White 'a' would have made his lead more tangible. But the 27-28 exchange is a bigger problem. Tozawa 9-dan's theory is that Black 27 at 'b' is worth more. The slightest gain would have led to an upset. If White had wrenched off a large



Ishida Yoshio

Born on 15 August 1948 in Aichi prefecture. Became a disciple of Kitani Minoru in 1957, made shodan in 1963, reached 9-dan in 1974.

Titles won (18):

- 1968: 12th Prime Minister's Cup
- 1969: 1st New Stars Tournament
- 1970: 17th Nihon Ki-in Championship
- 1971: 26th Honinbo title, 18th Nihon Ki-in Ch'ship, 8th Pro Best Ten
- 1972: 27th Honinbo title, 9th Pro Best Ten
- 1973: 28th Honinbo title
- 1974: 29th Honinbo title, 13th Meijin title, 22nd Oza title
- 1975: 30th Honinbo title
- 1978: 26th Oza title
- 1980: 12th Haya-go Ch'ship
- 1983: 15th Haya-go Ch'ship
- 1984: 16th Haya-go Ch'ship, 10th Tengen title




Figure 3 (104 - 150)
28: retakes




Figure 4 (151 - 204)

area here with 28 at 'c', Black 'd', White 29, the game would have been over. Of course, Black might have been able to play 29 at 'b'.

Kido: White is already uncatchable?

K: If Black had played 87 in Figure 4 at 94, it would have been a half-point result.

White wins by 1½ points.

('Kido', January 1985)

Game Two

White: Kataoka Satoshi

Black: Ishida Yoshio


Played on 19 November 1984 at the Nihon Ki-in.

Figure 1 (1 - 50)


White 22. Kataoka also considered invading at 'a' first.

Black 29. A light move which was much admired by other professionals. The standard move is 1 in Dia. 1, but presumably Ishida's reasoning was that after 2 and 4 Black 1 would be better located at 'a'.

White 36. A superb move. Dia. 2 shows that



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Black can't counterattack. Perhaps Black 35 should have been at 45. When White continues by capping at 44, he gets a good sabaki shape for his group.

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Black 53. The meeting point of the two moyos.

Black 55. If omitted, White would launch a severe attack at 91.

White 56. Kataoka: 'I had no idea where to play. I couldn't see anything else. . .'

Black 57. A bit too solid, perhaps. Black could consider responding indirectly with 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' (or even Black 62), the idea being to fight it out when White peeps at 'd'. White




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

71: ko; 74: ko; 92: connects (at 63)

would live, but Black would do well to the left and in the centre. Kataoka met 57 with the superb moves of 58 and 60, a combination much praised by Yamabe.

Black 63, 65. Black doesn't have a satisfactory answer to 62, so he enlarges the battle front. For example, Black 1 in Dia. 3 gives a bad result, as after the moves to 8 White 'a' and 'b' are both threats.

White 72 is a perfect ko threat. Black could kill White by answering at 2 in Dia. 4, but perhaps Ishida figured that that would give White unlimited ko threats. Still, the result to 83, with White living in sente (Black can't start a ko with 'e'—Black 'f' because his own group will die if he loses it) is terrible. Breaking into White's left-side position (63 etc.) doesn't seem to be adequate compensation.




Figure 3 (101 – 150)

White 8. Perhaps White should have extended at 9.

White 10 is thin: he has to add a move immediately to defend against Black 'a', so 10 should have been at 20. Black launches a severe attack with 15 and 17. Instead of 18, apparently White should have counterattacked with 'b'; a long and complicated fight would follow, but White should be able to live. When Black cuts him off with 21, Kataoka decides to give up this group and to attack Black's group on the right with 28.

Figure 4 (151 – 200)

Black is unable to link up, but he does set up a large semeai. When Black prevents White from linking up to the top with 61, the game seems to be all over: Black is clearly way ahead in the race to capture. The only problem was that Ishida had run out of time. His first mistake was 61 itself: he should first have exchanged Black 70 for White 'a'.

Black 73 is the major blunder — if at 98, Black would still have won the semeai by one move (before he was two moves ahead).




Figure 3 (101 – 150)




Figure 4 (151 – 200)

84, 87: ko; 92: right of 89; 94: at 54; 97: ko; 99: at 89

Black gets a ko with 83, but he has no chance of winning it.

Figure 5 (201 – 242) (next page)

Black 7. Too small, of course, but the best ko threat that Black has. The game is over after White 8, but Ishida played on — it probably took him quite a while to reconcile himself to having lost a fight in which he was so far ahead.

Black resigns after White 242.

(Adapted from 'Kido', January 1985.)




Figure 5 (201 - 242)
17: ko (left of 6); 20: connects

Game Three

White: Ishida Yoshio

Black: Kataoka Satoshi

Played on 3 December 1984 in Kawasaki City.

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Black 23. A good tenuki — there is nothing wrong with playing out the joseki with 'a' etc., but Black does not want to fall in line with White's fuseki strategy.

White 40. Better to play 'b' first; Black would answer at 'c', so White could then attach at 40. Ishida had expected Black to answer 40 at 44.



Dia. 1

White switches to 46 because following Dia. 1 would give him a heavy group in the centre.

White 46. White is hoping for a chance to use his sente move at 'd'.





Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Figure 2 (51 - 100)


White 54. Essential — if at 'a', Black would play 54, forcing White 'b', then link up with 'c', White 55, Black 'd'. That would leave White with little aji to play with on the right.

Up to 68, White achieves his objectives, in that he gets a reasonable result at the centre top while also living in the corner, but Black gets plenty of territory, so the result favours him slightly. It seems that he cannot try to kill the corner group. Usually he can reduce it to one eye with 1 and 3 in Dia. 2, but the aji of the two captured stones to the left means that White can live with 6 and 8. If Black 9, White captures him with 10. If Black 7 at 1 in Dia. 3, White still captures him with 2 to 6.

Black 73. Must be at 76, Shuko commented. He scolded Kataoka after the game for letting his opponent take this crucial point. Kataoka was worried about White 'e', but according to Shuko




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Black 'f' would maintain territorial balance.

The game looked good for White when he lived up to 100, but there was a surprise to come.



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

overlay that invites a severe attack; it should be at 'b'.

White 34. If at 35, Black 34. Kataoka thought that he had won when he captured with 35.

White 46, 48. Do-or-die moves: White should defend in the centre, but then he would lose on territory. Ishida confessed later that he expected the centre group to die.



read out all the variations because of lack of time, and in any case he expected 55 to be sente. When White saves his group with 60, the game is very close but tilting slightly in his favour.

Black 83. Regretted by Kataoka, who claimed that he might have won if he had blocked at 'a' (relying on the fact that he had more ko threats than White). However, Ishida claimed that White would still have been narrowly ahead.




Figure 5 (201 - 254)

Figure 5 (201 - 254)

Ishida's victory in this game showed us another side of his character. Instead of the cool, calculating computer, we saw an adventuresome player who was prepared to take a chance — with 46 (in Figure 1) and 146 (46 in Figure 3) — when he was in trouble. For his part, Kataoka also played well, especially with his tenuki in the taisha and his severe attack with 123 (23 in Figure 3), so the result was a game worthy of a title match. With the fortunes of war favouring Ishida, he now had a decisive advantage.

White wins by 2½ points.

Game Four

White: Kataoka Satoshi

Black: Ishida Yoshio

Played on 17 December 1984 at the Nihon Ki-in.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio.

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Black 27 and 29 seem to be reasonable forcing moves once White makes the narrow extension to 26.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White 32. Very tight — the conventional approach is to press at 'a' (Black answers at 32).

White 42. Ishida expected White 'b' — he was grateful for the chance to play 43 and 45. He felt that these moves gave him the lead.





Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Black 55, erasing the aji of 'a', is solid.

The placid development of the game is disturbed by White's peep at 64, a move that Ishida overlooked. Black is unable to resist (if 67 at 1 in Dia. 1, White gets a ko), so black territory is suddenly transformed into white. That makes the game even again. White might even be ahead. Hindsight indicates that 59 or 61 should have been at 78.



Dia. 1

Black 83. Black makes sure of linking up to the left (i.e., with 77 in Figure 4) before White gets too much thickness on the outside.

Black 85. The exchange for 86 looks bad, as the latter eliminates White's weakness at 'b', but once White has built centre thickness with 82 and 84, Black cannot really hope to get away with invading at 'b' anyway.

White 94 could also be at 'c', but Black is confident of winning any contest in surrounding territory.




Figure 3 (101 – 150)

46: connects

Figure 3 (101 – 150)

Black 1. Better at 41, as White 4 creates the defect at 20. A very difficult fight follows in the centre, but, since both sides suffer losses to counterbalance their gains up to 32, the game remains evenly balanced. Black is just a little behind.

Figure 4 (151 – 200)

White 58. The losing move. White must add a stone at 60 after 59, but then Black plays 61, preventing White from making any territory in

Ishida on Kataoka:

'While Kataoka is the same kind of player as I, he emphasizes thickness a little more – he's the type of player who uses thickness to overhaul you late in the game. My go is a little thin . . . The fact that his go resembles mine makes it difficult in some ways to play him.'





Figure 4 (151 – 200)

this area. Instead of 58, White should play 99, forcing Black 'b', then hane at 'c'. He would then be sure of getting some points here. If Black next defended at 'd', White could switch to 62.

White 82. The correct move is 'e' – White is taking a chance. The danger passes when Black docilely connects at 83. Instead, he could attach at 1 in Dia. 2. If White blocks at 2, Black pushes through at 3; if White 'a', Black 'b'; if instead White 'c', Black plays 'a' and links up to Black 1. In either case, that means that White can't play 2; instead he must answer 1 at 'd'. Black could then go back to 83, having gained from playing 1.

White 84. Dia. 2 is now impossible – Black has



Dia. 2




Figure 5 (201 – 250)
Ko (at 27): 39, 42, 45, 48

lost two points here. Fortunately for him, he could spare them.

Figure 5 (201 – 250)

Black 27, 29. Worth two points in sente.

Figure 6 (251 – 297)

Appropriately for these players, the title was decided by an endgame contest. In this, the renovated old-model computer proved victorious.




Figure 6 (251 – 297)
Ko (at 51): 54, 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75;
ko (at 77): 80, 83, 86, 89;
93: connects (right of 77)

Kataoka: 'My gain from this title match was that I lost the illusion that I was strong at the endgame. As far as precision goes, Ishida is superior . . . I hope to meet Ishida again.'

Black wins by 1½ points.

('Kido', January 1985. Tengen report translated by John Power.)



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
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